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I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 1997, the membership of the American Law Institute (ALI) 
voted to adopt its Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restate-
ment (Third)").1 This historic vote occurred some thirty years after the 
ALI first articulated the theory of strict liability in tort in section 402A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") ,2 and twenty-
one years after the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted section 
402A as the law of Maryland in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 3 As Mary-
land has yet to adopt the Restatement (Third), its precedent in the prod-
ucts liability arena is rooted in statutory and common law developed 
from the Restatement (Second). 
The ALI's formulation of section 402A liability in turn was rooted 
primarily in the experience of claims for manufacturing defects. In 
the three decades since its adoption by the ALI, the law of products 
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LlAB. (1998) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)]. 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND)]. See infra text accompanying note 394 in the Appendix for the 
text of section 402A. 
3. 278 Md. 337,363 A.2d 955 (1976). See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 
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liability has expanded exponentially and the breadth of that develop-
ment is now reflected in the ALI's newest Restatement. This latest ALI 
effort reflects thirty years of common-law precedent concerning de-
sign-defect claims, failure-to-warn claims, crashworthiness/ enhanced 
injury claims, special rules for claims arising out of contaminated 
human blood and prescription products, claims involving products 
whose manufacturers cannot be identified, changes in burdens of 
proof and quantum of proof, the limits of recovery for so-called "pure 
economic loss," judicial and legislative adoption of comparative fault 
principles, evidentiary issues involving compliance and noncompli-
ance with safety statutes and regulations, statutory preemption of com-
mon-law liability principles, and claims testing the limits of 
foreseeability and the appropriate allocation of social responsibility 
for accidents arising out of products placed in the stream of com-
merce by commercial enterprises. In short, the law of products liabil-
ity has gone far beyond its simple origins as articulated in section 
402A of the Restatement (Second). 
This Article sets forth the twenty-one sections comprising the ALI's 
replacement for section 402A and contrasts the principles enunciated 
in those new sections with current Maryland products liability law.4 
The Article identifies the areas of congruence, points of divergence, 
and territory explored in the Restatement (Third) yet uncharted in Ma-
ryland appellate decisions. 
II. CHAPTER 1: LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELL-
ERS BASED ON DEFECTS AT TIME OF SALE 
A. Liability Rules Applicable to Products Generally 
l. Section 1: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm 
Caused by Defective Products 
One engaged in the business of selling or otheIWise distribut-
ing products who sells or distributes a defective product is 
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the product defect.5 
4. The "black letter" of each section of the Restatement (Third) oj Torts: Products 
Liability ("Restatement (Third)") is reprinted as the heading of each subsec-
tion, following the chapter and heading organization adopted and promul-
gated by the ALI at its May 20, 1997 membership meeting. To conserve 
space only the black letter of the Restatement (Third) appears; the official 
comments and the Reporters' Notes have been omitted. Undoubtedly, as 
was true with section 402A, the comments will be looked to by the courts as 
an invaluable guide in interpreting the new black letter provisions. It 
should be remembered that when the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
adopted section 402A strict liability, it also adopted all of the official com-
ments that went with it. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 436, 
601 A.2d 633,641 reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665, 602 A.2d 1182 (1992); 
Phipps, 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60. 
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1. 
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This general rule of tort liability applies to commercial sellers and 
other distributors for harm caused by defective products. Liability 
rules specific to certain types of products are set forth in sections 5 
through 8 under the next topic. 6 
Section 1 reflects the expansion of products liability law from cases 
involving manufacturing defects-upon which section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) was grounded-to cases of design defects or defects 
based on inadequate warnings or instructions.7 
The majority of jurisdictions, including Maryland,S recognize these 
three categories of defect in products liability law. Maryland cases re-
flect the general difficulties of courts nationwide attempting to fit all 
three categories of defect into the same doctrinal mold under section 
402A. 
The Restatement (Third) recognizes that the rule developed to pro-
tect users from manufacturing defects-where a seller is held liable 
for harm caused by the defect although all possible care has been ex-
ercised in the preparation of the product-is inappropriate to resolve 
claims of defective design and defects based on inadequate warnings 
or instructions. Using a traditional negligence "reasonableness test," 
subsections 2(b) and 2(c) require a determination that the product 
could have reasonably been made safe by a better design, instruction, 
or warning.9 This alleviates the difficulties found using section 402A 
principles with these product-defect categories. This too is consistent 
with current Maryland law.1o 
2. Section 2: Categories of Product Defects 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribu-
tion, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in de-
sign, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or 
warnings. A product: 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible 
care was exercised in the preparation and marketing 
of the product; 
6. See infra notes 127-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of sections 5 
through 8 of Restatement (Third). 
7. See infra notes 11-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 2 of 
the Restatement (Third). 
8. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); 
Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701 
(1988); Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 537 A.2d 622 
(1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co., 
317 Md. 185,562 A.2d 1246 (1989). 
9. See infra text accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2 of the Restate-
ment (Third). 
10. See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of subsections 
2(b) and 2(c). 
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(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predeces-
sor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the 
omission of the alternative design renders the product 
not reasonably safe; 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or 
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by 
the product could have been reduced or avoided by 
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by 
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of 
the instructions or warnings renders the product not 
reasonably safe. 1 1 
279 
"Strict products liability" is a term of art recognizing that products 
liability, an area of tort law, borrows concepts from both negligence 
and warranty law. I2 Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) clarifies the 
existing categories of products liability by defining them: a product 
may be defective upon its sale or distribution as a result of its manu-
facture, design, or failure to warn. 13 
Maryland courts resolve product defects under section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) recognizing the same three categories of defect.I4 
A product is defective if: (1) at the time of sale, the product contained 
a flaw that made it more dangerous than intended; (2) the product's 
manufacturer failed to adequately warn the consumer of a risk or haz-
ard; or (3) the product was defectively designed. I5 
Under section 402A, recovery for any defect requires that: (1) the 
product was in a defective condition at the time it left the seller's con-
trol; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user; (3) the 
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2. 
12. [d. § 1 cmt. a. 
13. [d. § 2. 
14. See generally Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 
(1976). 
15. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 118, 740 A.2d 102, 117 (1999). 
A "defective condition" is present when the "product is, at the time it leaves 
the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) § 402A cmt. g. Comment i defines an "unreasonably dangerous" 
product as one that is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
[the contemplation of] the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." 
[d. § 402A cmt. i. In design defect cases, however, Maryland courts employ 
the "risk/utility" balancing test rather than a "consumer-expectation test" 
to determine whether a specific design is defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous. See Nissan Motor Co., 129 Md. App. at 118, 740 A.2d at 117; see also 
infra notes 72-75. 
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defect caused the injury; and (4) the product was expected to and did 
reach the user without a substantial change in its condition. 16 
a. Manufacturing Defects 
Section 2(a) imposes liability irrespective of whether a manufac-
turer's quality control efforts satisfy standards of reasonableness. Ma-
ryland subscribes to this ruleP 
Liability without fault is imposed on manufacturing defects rather 
than design or warning defects because manufacturing defects may be 
caused by fault difficult to prove. 18 Also, manufacturing flaws may be 
said to disappoint reasonable consumer expectations as to product 
performance. Moreover, sellers of products are in a better position 
than consumers to insure against the statistical risks of manufacturing 
defects and spread that risk through product pricing.19 
(1) Maryland's Adoption and Application of Strict Liability for Man-
ufacturing Defects 
In a strict liability claim involving a manufacturing defect the bur-
den of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that the product was in a 
defective condition when it left the hands of the manufacturer.2o Un-
less evidence is offered to prove the defect, the burden is not met.21 
Strict liability under section 402A for a manufacturing defect was 
adopted in Maryland in Phipps v. General Motors Corp.22 In Phipps, the 
plaintiff was injured when the accelerator of his employer's vehicle 
locked, resulting in a collision.23 Reasoning that defective products 
result in injuries and the cost of these i~uries should be borne by the 
manufacturer rather than the injured victims, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland abandoned the contractual privity between the plaintiff and 
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. 
17. Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958 ("[I]n an action founded on strict 
liability in tort, as opposed to a traditional negligence action, the plaintiff 
need not prove any specific act of negligence on the part of the seller. The 
relevant inquiry ... focuses not on the conduct of the seller, but rather on 
the product itself."); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 484-
85, 608 A.2d 1276, 1280 (1992) (dicta); Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685 
F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Maryland law) ("In manufacturing 
defect cases, the plaintiff proves that the product is defective simply by 
showing that it does not conform to the manufacturer's specifications."). 
See generally MARYLAND ClVlL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 26:14 (3d ed. 1993 
& Supp. 1998) [hereinafter MPJI]. 
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. 
19. [d. 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g. 
21. [d. 
22. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
23. [d. at 339, 363 A.2d at 956. 
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the manufacturer required for recovery.24 The court recognized that 
strict liability was imposed by law rather than by contract.25 For a 
manufacturer to be liable under section 402A, the product must be 
defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time it leaves the manu-
facturer's hands.26 
(2) Maryland Plaintiffs' Burden to Prove Defect, Attribution, and 
Causation 
In addition to satisfYing section 402A, Maryland courts impose a 
burden on a plaintiff to prove that a defect in the product exists, that 
the defect is attributed to the seller, and that the defect was the pr:oxi-
mate cause of the accident.27 For instance, inJensen v. American Motors 
Corp.,28 the plaintiff was injured after his jeep, manufactured by the 
defendant, rolled over on the highway.29 The defendant was granted 
summary judgment because Mr. Jensen did not prove a causal rela-
tionship between the defect and the accident.30 He unsuccessfully re-
lied on circumstantial evidence to infer that the accident was caused 
by a defect in the vehicle.31 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
held that, "proof of a defect must arise above surmise, conjecture or 
speculation; and one's right to recovery may not rest on any presump-
tion from the happening of an accident."32 
Similarly, in Singleton v. International Harvester CO.,33 a plaintiff suf-
fered injuries when his tractor, manufactured by the defendant, over-
turned.34 The plaintiff contended that his injuries were caused by the 
absence of a rollover protective structure, which was a defect in design 
and not manufacture. The trial court dismissed the case because 
there was insufficient proof of both defect and a causal connection to 
the defendant.35 The Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, affirmed 
the trial court, holding that a strict liability claim, regardless of 
24. [d. at 342,343,363 A.2d at 957,958. This allows the risk to be shifted to the 
manufacturer, who is in a better financial position to absorb the loss. [d. at 
343, 363 A.2d at 958. 
25. [d. at 342, 363 A.2d at 958. Previously, manufacturer defects claims were 
based on the theory of an express or implied warranty between the plaintiff 
and the manufacturer. [d. 
26. [d. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959. 
27. See Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 437 A.2d 242 
(1981); Virgil v. Kash N' Carry Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 484A.2d 652 (1984); 
Ziegler v. Kawasaki Indus., 74 Md. App. 613,539 A.2d 701 (1988). 
28. 50 Md. App. 226,437 A.2d 242 (1981). 
29. [d. at 228, 437 A.2d at 244. 
30. [d. 
31. [d. The driver testified that he last heard a squeal in the tires and then lost 
control of his vehicle. [d. These facts were insufficient to draw an infer-
ence that a defect was the cause of the accident. [d. 
32. [d. at 232, 437 A.2d at 242. 
33. 685 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1981). 
34. [d. at 113. 
35. [d. at 114. 
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whether a defect in manufacture or design is alleged, must focus on 
the product and not the reasonableness of the manufacturer.36 As the 
plaintiff was unable to produce sufficient evidence to establish a con-
nection between a defect in the product and the cause of the acci-
dent, his case was dismissed.37 
This burden has been more easily met in other fact situations that 
involve an alleged defect in manufacturing as opposed to a defect in 
design.38 Various Maryland cases have ruled that evidence of few facts, 
in addition to an accident occurring, may be sufficient to raise an in-
ference of a manufacturing defect by circumstantial evidence.39 A 
plaintiff must introduce evidence supporting the following three-
prongs in a products liability claim: "(1) the existence ofa defect, (2) 
the attribution of the defect to the seller, and (3) a causal relation 
between the defect and the injury."4o 
In Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Corp.,41 the plaintiff suffered injuries while 
using her thermos, manufactured by the defendant, which imploded 
after she filled it with hot coffee and milk.42 The court of special ap-
peals stated that the plaintiff needed minimal additional evidence to 
establish that the defect causing the implosion either existed when the 
product was purchased or soon thereafter.43 The court permitted an 
inference of a defect from the accident's occurrence, so long as other 
causes of the accident were eliminated by circumstantial evidence.44 
As such, the court held that the evidence introduced was sufficient to 
reasonably infer that the defect existed at the time of manufacture 
and was the cause of the accident.45 
In addition, the court of appeals in Eaton Corp. v. Wrighe46 held that 
a manufacturing defect caused an accident with little evidence prof-
36. Id. at 114, 117. 
37. Id. at 117. 
38. See, e.g., Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Corp., 61 Md. App. 23,484 A.2d 652 (1984); 
Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977). For example, 
the accelerator of a car sticking to the floor, and the brakes of a new vehicle 
failing are instances in which very little additional evidence of a manufac-
turing defect would be necessary. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 
337,345-46,363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976). 
39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
40. Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 23, 484 A.2d at 352. 
41. 61 Md. App. 23,484 A>2d 652 (1984). 
42. Id. at 25, 484 A.2d at 654. 
43. /d. at 30-31,484 A.2d at 657-58. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing 
that the defect existed at the time of manufacturing by a more likely than 
not standard. Id. This determination was based on the testimony of the 
plaintiff, which tended to eliminate the possibility that the defect was cre-
ated after the thermos was purchased. Id. Generally, the lapse of time be-
tween purchase and accident is a factor in determining causation; it was not 
a substantial factor in this case because the thermos was purchased three 
months prior to the accident. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. /d. 
46. 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977). 
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fered by the plaintiff.47 Mter being injured in an explosion using the 
propane torch and fuel canister manufactured by the defendant, the 
plaintiff alleged that these products were defectively manufactured.48 
On reviewing the trial court's decision on summary judgment, the 
court held that, in the absence of misuse by the plaintiff, the explo-
sion of the canister only hours after its purchase is prima facie evidence 
of the defendant's strict liability.49 The court required no additional 
evidence regarding the precise nature of the defect.50 
b. DesifJ'l Defects 
In defective design cases, the focus is on whether the design of the 
product is defective, rather than on the conduct of the manufacturer 
in designing it. 51 Because design defects cannot be determined by 
reviewing the manufacture's specifications, they are predicated on a 
different concept of responsibility than manufacturing defects.52 
(1) Tests Used to Determine Design Defects 
Historically, different states have employed one of two tests to deter-
mine the existence of a design defect: the "risk-utility test," the major-
ity rule, and the "consumer-expectation" test, the minority rule. 
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) adopts the reasonableness 
(risk-utility balancing) test as the standard for judging design defects. 
If a reasonable, alternative design would have reduced, at a reasona-
ble cost, the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product such that 
omission of the alternative design rendered the product not reasona-
bly safe, then the risk outweighs the utility and the manufacturer is 
strictly liable. Maryland decisions support this analysis. 53 
47. Id. at 89, 375 A.2d at 1127. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
5l. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g. 
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. 
53. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Nissan 
Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 740 A.2d lO2 (1999); Klein v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 608 A.2d 1276 (1992); Lundgren v. 
Ferno-Wash. Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 565 A.2d 335 (1989); Ziegler v. Kawa-
saki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701 (1988); C & KLord, 
Inc. v. Carter, 74 Md. App. 68, 536 A.2d 699 (1988); Troja v. Black & 
Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985); Banks v. Iron 
Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984); see also Binakonsky 
v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying Maryland 
law); Johnson v. Int'l Harvester Co., 702 F.2d. 492, 494 (4th Cir. 1983) (ap-
plying Maryland law); Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 
(4th Cir. 1981) (applying Maryland law). Accord Kelley v. RG. Indus., 304 
Md. 124, 136,497 A.2d 1143, 1149-50 (1989) (stating in dicta, "[a]nother 
test used to determine whether a defect exists under § 402A is the 'risk/ 
utility' test"). 
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The burden of proving a reasonable alternative design lies with the 
plaintiff, however, a plaintiff is not required to actually produce a pro-
totype in order to present a prima facie case of design defect. 54 For the 
case to be submitted to the trier of fact, the plaintiff must produce 
sufficient evidence such that reasonable persons could conclude that 
a reasonable alternative design could have been practically adopted at 
the time the product was originally marketed.55 Maryland courts al-
ready follow this approach. 56 
Undertaking a risk-utility assessment by weighing the relevant ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the product's features is necessary. 57 
This category of strict liability is more challenging because consumer 
expectations are more difficult to discern for such defects, and setting 
appropriate levels of design safety is not directly analogous to the set-
ting of levels of quality control by a manufacturer. 58 
Reference to consumer expectations is more appropriate in manu-
facturing defect cases because they are easier to apply than in cases 
involving defects in design, warnings, or instructions. 59 Maryland case 
law is somewhat inconsistent regarding the proper role of consumer 
expectations in determining the existence of a design or warnings 
defect. 60 
The better-reasoned Maryland decisions, the general weight of au-
thority and the Restatement (Third) do not employ a consumer-expecta-
tion test for determining defects in design, warnings, or instructions. 
While what the consumer expects arguably may be one of several fac-
tors to be balanced as part of the risk-utility test, consumer expecta-
tions in and of themselves do not serve as an independent standard 
for determining the existence of a defect in design, warning, or in-
struction. Rather, the proper test for design-defect cases is the risk-
utility test. 61 
Maryland courts have carved out, however, a narrow subset of de-
fects involving so-called "inherently unreasonable risks." In these 
cases, the courts have found it unnecessary, as a matter of law, to even 
determine whether the defect is one of manufacture or design, much 
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f. 
55. Id. 
56. See Phipps, 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955; Nissan Motor Co., 129 Md. App. 80, 
740 A.2d 102; Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App. 695, 566 A.2d 
135 (1989), em. denied, 318 Md. 683, 569 A.2d 1242 (1990). 
57. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also infra notes and accompa-
nying text 71-71. 
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. 
59. Id. § 2 cmt. g. More than any other type of defect, manufacturing defects 
disappoint consumer expectations. The consumer-expectation test is more 
difficult to apply in design-defect cases. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d 
at 958-59. 
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g. 
61. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the risk-
utility test. 
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less to differentiate between the standards of proof for either type of 
defect.62 To the extent that such defects potentially involve inherently 
unreasonable design defects, they may be viewed as instances in which 
no reasonable person could conclude that the manufacturer's chosen 
design was reasonably safe. In other words, in these rare instances, 
reasonable consumer expectations as to safety so overwhelm any off-
setting benefits of the design as to render it defective as a matter of 
law. 63 
According to the Restatement (Third), as long as the plaintiff estab-
lishes a defect under the functional criteria enumerated in section 2, 
courts are free to utilize the concepts of negligence, strict liability, or 
implied warranty of merchantability as theories of liability.64 Failure 
to meet the requisites of section 2 will defeat a cause of action under 
these other legal theories.65 
Comment n states, however, that two or more factually identical de-
sign-defect claims, or two or more factually identical failure-to-warn 
claims, may not be submitted to the trier of fact under different doc-
trinal labels, as doing so would create general confusion and could 
result in inconsistent verdicts. Both of these categories of defect in-
volve a risk-utility assessment under sections 2(b) and 2(c), respec-
tively, a determination that is functionally indistinguishable from 
proof of negligence. Thus, for example, if a design-defect claim is 
characterized as strict liability, a negligence in design claim on the 
same facts should not be permitted. The same is true for claims based 
on inadequate warnings. To date, Maryland courts have not demon-
strated, at least not sua sponte, any inclination to curtail the pursuit of 
alternative legal theories for factually identical design-defect claims, or 
identical failure-to-warn claims.66 
62. Lundgren v. Ferno-Wash Co., 80 Md. App. 522, 529, 565 A.2d 335, 339 
(1989) (holding that the threshold question of whether a defect involves an 
inherently unreasonable risk is for the court to decide). 
63. For discussion of defects involving "inherently unreasonable risks," see 
supra note 53. 
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n. 
65. [d. 
66. See, e.g., Singleton v. Infl Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(applying Maryland law) (noting that because proof requirements are 
greater for negligence than for strict liability, there is no need to instruct 
jury concerning negligence if the evidence does not support strict liability); 
Liesener v. Weslow, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 857,860 (D. Md. 1991) (noting that 
strict liability, negligence and breach of implied warranty alleged for failure 
to warn); Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 291, 336 A.2d 118, 
120 (1975) (noting that negligence and breach of implied warranty alleged 
for failure to warn); Blaw Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 88 Md. App. 
655,667-68,596 A.2d 679, 685 (1991) (noting that strict liability and negli-
gence alleged for design defect and failure to warn); Dechello v. Johnson 
Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235 n.4, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 n.4, eert. denied suh 
nom., Albert E. Pecora Imps. v. Dechello, 312 Md. 601,541 A.2d 964 (1988) 
(noting that strict liability, negligence and breach of implied warranty al-
leged for manufacturing defect and for failure to warn); Banks v. Iron Hus-
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A claim of manujacturingdefect under section 2(a), however, may be 
combined with a claim of negligent manufacturing, because they rest 
on different factual predicates.67 Negligence rests on proof of fault 
leading to a product defect, whereas strict liability merely requires 
proof of the defect itself, not whether it arose from carelessness. 
(2) Maryland's Application of Strict Liability for Design Defects 
Gen~rally,68 Maryland courts employ the risk-utility balancing test 
to determine whether a design is defective.69 To prevail, plaintiffs are 
required to prove six elements: (1) the existence of an alternative de-
sign that is safer than the suspect product design; (2) the availability 
of the materials necessary for production of the alternative design; (3) 
the technological feasibility of manufacturing the alternative design at 
the time that the product was manufactured from the suspect design; 
(4) the cost of producing the alternative design; (5) the price to the 
consumer resulting from the manufacturer's use of the alternative de-
sign; and (6) the chances of consumer acceptance of the alternative 
design. 70 
tler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 411,475 A.2d 1243, 1244 (1984) (noting that 
strict liability and negligence alleged for design defect). But see, Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747-48 
(1974) (noting that negligence theory, not strict liability theory, applies to 
claim that an alleged design defect rendered motor vehicle un-
crashworthy); Zieglerv. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 618, 
539 A.2d 701, 704, cert. denied, 313 Md. 32, 542 A.2d 858 (1988) (declining 
to address the validity, vel non, of strict liability claim, as opposed to negli-
gence claim, for a failure to warn). Cf Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 
608,611 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that defenses based on post-sale alteration 
of product are "functionally equivalent" under both strict liability and negli-
gence causes of action). 
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n. 
68. The Phipps court stated that there are some cases where design defects are 
"inherently unreasonable" and do not require a balancing test. Phipps v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344-45, 363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976). An 
example of an inherently dangerous design defect is a gas pedal on a new 
car that suddenly sticks, causing the vehicle to accelerate without warning. 
Other examples include "a steering mechanism which causes a car to sud-
denly veer off the road, a drive shaft on an automobile which falls off while 
the car is being operated in a safe manner, and brakes on a new automobile 
which suddenfy fail." Id. at 345-46, 363 A.2d at 955. 
69. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see aLm MPJI 26:13 (explaining the 
factors to be balanced: "the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers in-
herent in the product and their avoidability"). But see Simpson v. Standard 
Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199,203-04,527 A.2d 1337, 1340 (1987) (sug-
gesting in dicta that the "consumer expectation test" may also be applicable 
in design defect cases). Cf Kelley v. RG. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 135, 497 
A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985) (deviating from Maryland's general application of 
the consumer-expectation test when considering handguns because con-
sumers expect handguns to be dangerous as part of their normal function). 
70. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 120,740 A.2d 102, 118 (1999). 
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c. Inadequate Instructions or Warnings 
Like design defects, a determination as to whether instructions or 
warnings are inadequate and, thus, defective cannot be made by re-
viewing the manufacturer's specifications.71 Therefore, the Restate-
ment (Third) employs the risk-utility test to make this determination.72 
(1) Maryland's Application of Strict Liability for Inadequate Instruc-
tions or Warnings of Product Hazards 
It is well-established in Maryland law that a manufacturer may be 
liable for placing a product on the market that has inadequate instruc-
tions and warnings.73 To determine whether a warning is adequate, 
Maryland has adopted the same reasonableness balancing test, also 
referred to as the risk-utility balancing test, as is used in analyzing de-
sign-defect claims.74 When determining this balance, instructions and 
warnings that are too detailed may not be considered to provide a 
sufficient warning. This is so because "[w]ell-meaning attempts to 
warn of every possible accident lead over time to voluminous yet im-
penetrable labels-too prolix to read and too technical to under-
stand."75 In addition, Maryland imposes no duty on manufacturers to 
predict a consumer's violation of clear, easily understandable safety 
warnings.76 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. 
Id. 
See Simpson, 72 Md. App. at 203, 527 A2d at 1339-40; Moran v. Faberge, 
Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A2d 11, 15 (1975). 
Moran, 273 Md. at 543, 332 A2d at 15. 
Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Ma-
ryland law). 
Hood, 181 F.3d at 612; see also Simpson, 72 Md. App. at 20~7, 527 A2d at 
1341 (stating that "'[w]here warning is given, the seller may reasonably as-
sume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warn-
ing, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is 
it unreasonably dangerous'") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. 
j) . 
In Hood v. Ryobi America Corp., the plaintiff was using an electric saw 
manufactured by the defendant from which he removed the blade-guards. 
Hood, 181 F.3d at 609. After using the saw without the guards for about 
twenty minutes, the blade detached from the saw cutting Mr. Hood's leg 
and thumb. Id. at 609-10. Although there were several warnings on both 
the saw and in the owner's manual to never operate the saw without the 
guards, the plaintiff alleged that there were inadequate warnings on the 
saw and, thus, were defective. Id. The plaintiff thought the warnings were 
to prevent objects such as clothing and fingers from coming into contact 
with the blade, not that removal would cause the blade to become de-
tached. Id. He contended that the manufacturer had the duty to state the 
actual consequences of operating the saw without the guards and that the 
warnings given were inadequate. Id. at 610. The court held that the manu-
facturer's warnings were not required to list all the consequences of im-
proper use and that the saw was not defective because the plaintiff altered 
and used the tool against the defendant's warnings. Id. In reaching this 
determination, the court stated that "a clear and specific warning will nor-
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(2) Failure-to-Warn Inconsistencies: Cause of Action and Distinction 
of Claim 
In Maryland, failure-to-warn cases have either proceeded as negli-
gence causes of action or, if brought as strict liability claims, have 
been rendered functionally indistinguishable from common-law negli-
gence claims.77 When failure-to-warn cases proceed as negligence 
claims, however, the claimant need not prove the manufacturer failed 
to exercise reasonable care.78 
A second issue regarding treatment of failure-to-warn claims is 
whether this claim is subsumed under design defects or whether it is 
an independent ground for recovery. At least one case interpreting 
Maryland law has observed that '''failure to warn' liability is merely a 
type of design defect. "79 
mally be sufficient-the manufacturer need not warn of every mishap or 
source of injury that the mind can imagine flowing from the product." Id. 
(quoting Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D. Md. 1991». 
77. See, e.g., Higgins v. Diversey Corp., 998 F. Supp 598, 604 (D. Md. 1997) 
(referencing the "strong resemblance" and common elements of negli-
gence and strict liability for failure to warn under Maryland law); Liesener, 
775 F. Supp. at 860 ("There is persuasive authority that the duty to warn in 
Maryland is essentially identical under the V.C.C. [for breach of implied 
warranty], the law of negligence, and the law of strict liability, i.e., there is a 
duty to provide a reasonable warning of latent defects . . . . There is, of 
course, no duty to warn of obvious dangers .... "); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 435, 601 A.2d 633, 640 (1992) ("[I]n a failure to 
warn case governed by the Restatement § 402A and Commentj, negligence 
concepts to some extent have been grafted onto strict liability."); Mazda 
Motor of Am. v. Rogowski, 105 Md. App. 318, 325, 659 A.2d 391, 394 (1995) 
(noting the "strong resemblance" and common elements of negligence and 
strict liability for failure to warn); Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 84 Md. App. 
397,410,579 A.2d 1191, 1198 (1990) ("The distinction between negligence 
and strict liability lessens considerably in failure to warn cases." (citing Wer-
ner v. Vpjohn Co., 628 F.2d. 848 (4th Cir. 1980»). See also Lohrmann v. 
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d. 1156, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying 
Maryland law) (including references to "reasonableness" at the time of 
manufacture in jury charge concerning strict liability for failure to warn was 
not in error); MPJI 26:3 (classifYing a manufacturer's failure to fulfill its 
duty to give an adequate warning as "negligence"). There also is significant 
overlap between strict liability of a failure to warn and a breach of an im-
plied warranty of merchantability for the same failure to warn. Dechello v. 
Johnson Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235 n.4, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 n.4 (1988). 
78. Singleton v. Int'l Harvestor Co., 685 F.2d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying 
Maryland law) ("The sole difference between liability for negligence and 
strict liability [for a failure to warn] is that the plaintiff in proving negli-
gence must prove not only that the product was unreasonably dangerous 
but also that the failure to warn was the result of the defendant's failure to 
use due care."). 
79. Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 934 F. Supp. 713, 718 (D. Md. 1996) (citing 
Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701 (1988». 
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d. Defenses to Strict Liability Claims in Maryland 
Maryland courts recognize several defenses in an action based on 
strict liability in tort.80 A manufacturer is not liable where injury re-
sults from the user's abnormal handling or use of the product.81 Nor 
is the seller liable when the product is delivered in a safe condition 
but is subsequently mishandled.82 In addition, if adequate warnings 
and instructions are supplied but are disregarded by the consumer, 
liability will not be imposed.83 Finally, a manufacturer may also de-
fend under the consumer's assumption of the risk.84 
3. Section 3: Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Prod-
uct Defect . 
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff 
was caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or 
distribution, without proof of the specific nature of the de-
fect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: 
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of prod-
uct defect; and 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of 
causes other than product defect existing at the time 
of sale or distribution.85 
Section 3 is rooted in the negligence concept of res ipsa loquitur-
"the thing speaks for itself.,,86 As products liability law developed, 
cases arose in which an inference of defect could be drawn from the 
incident itself, without proof of the precise nature of the defect. More 
often than not, such cases arose in the context of manufacturing de-
fects, typically evidenced by a product malfunction. The rule is not, 
however, restricted to manufacturing defects alone. 
Comment b to section 3 emphasizes the difference between a gen-
eral inference of defect under section 3 and claims of defect brought 
directly under sections 1 and 2: "Section 3 claims are limited to situa-
tions where a product fails to perform its manifestly intended func-
tion, thus supporting the conclusion that a defect of some kind is the 
most probable explanation."87 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958-59 
(1976). 
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. h. A seller is not liable for a 
child who becomes ill from eating too much candy. Id. Similarly, a manu-
facturer is not liable for mishandling when a bottled beverage is kicked 
over and the cap is removed. Id. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. g. 
Id. § 402A cmt. j. 
Id .§ 402A cmt. n. Assumption of the risk applies where "a consumer un-
reasonably proceeds to use a product despite its known risk or danger. " Id. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3. 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1311 (7th ed. 1999). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. B. 
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Maryland allows circumstantial evidence to prove a defect in a prod-
ucts liability action in appropriate circumstances.88 A plaintiff filing a 
products liability suit in Maryland has the burden of establishing that 
it is more probable than not that the defect in the product existed 
when the product was sold.89 If this cannot be proven by direct evi-
dence, the plaintiff can introduce circumstantial evidence from which 
an inference of a product defect can be drawn.90 Proof of a defect, 
88. Compare Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Servo Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 31, 484 A.2d 
652, 656 (1984) (establishing defect without expert testimony "when a 
product [such as an imploding thermos bottle] fails to meet the reasonable 
expectations of the user, the inference is that there was some sort of defect, 
a precise definition of which is unnecessary") and Eaton Corp. V. Wright, 
281 Md. 80, 89, 375 A.2d 1122,1127 (1977) ("There can be little doubt that 
a propane canister, used immediately after purchase according to instruc-
tions on the label, which continues to allow gas to be released after an 
appliance has been removed, is defective and unreasonably dangerous .... 
There was no necessity for [plaintiffs] to show more concerning the precise 
nature of the defect.") with Jensen V. Am. Motors Corp., 50 Md. App. 226, 
229,437 A.2d 242, 244 (1981) (preventing inference of defect where plain-
tiff did not present evidence negating other causes of an accident and stat-
ing "[t]he bare fact that an accident happens to a product ... is usually not 
sufficient proof that it was in any way defective."). 
89. Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 32, 484 A.2d at 657. For the elements of a products 
liability claim filed under Maryland law, see supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text. 
90. See Harrison V. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 50, 549 A.2d 385, 390 
(1988). In Harrison, the plaintiffs brought a products liability action against 
the manufacturer and seller of a used car to recover damages caused by a 
fire within or behind the instrument panel of their 1978 Mercury Zephyr, 
which plaintiffs purchased "used" in 1982 with nearly 59,000 miles on the 
odometer. Id. at 43, 549 A.2d at 386. Shortly after purchasing the four-
year-old car, the Harrison's returned it to the seller, complaining that the 
tires were bald and it smelled of mildew. Id. at 43-44, 549 A.2d at 387. The 
tires were replaced, and the sales staff told the Harrison's that the smell 
would go away. Id. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387. Less than one year later, a fire 
ignited behind the instrument panel on the dashboard while Ms. Harrison 
was driving the car. Id. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387. She was injured when she 
escaped from the vehicle just prior to it colliding with a tree. Id. The plain-
tiffs asserted a breach of implied warranty and strict liability against the 
manufacturer. Id. at 50, 549 A.2d at 390. One of the plaintiffs' experts 
testified that "[c]ars shouldn't catch on fire going down the road," but 
could not determine what defect, if any, existed. Id. at 51,549 A.2d at 390. 
A second expert concluded that the fire was caused by an electrical short 
but was unable to give any indication that the short was caused by a defect 
in the automobile that existed at the time of the sale of the car in 1978. Id. 
In upholding the lower court's decision, granting summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant, the appellate court focused on the weakness of 
plaintiffs' evidence. Id. at 52, 549 A.2d at 391. The court emphasized this 
point, "[The appellants] have been unable to show that what might possibly 
have happened did probably happen .... [B]ecause a one-car accident 
happened without apparent cause, the manufacturer must be to blame. 
Such a theory is not supported by established principles of [products liabil-
ity]. It is simply wishful thinking." Id. at 54,549 A.2d at 392 (quotingJensen, 
50 Md. App. at 234-35, 437 A.2d at 247). Thus, the court concluded that a 
reasonable fact-finder would not be able to draw an inference that the 
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however, must rise above conjecture or speculation, and may not rest 
on a presumption that a defect exists based on the mere happening of 
the accident.91 This method of proving a product defect has been 
referred to as the "indeterminate defect theory."92 
Generally, an inference of a defect may be drawn where the circum-
stantial evidence tends to eliminate other possible causes, such as 
product misuse or alteration.93 In determining whether a product de-
fect may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, Maryland courts 
consider at least five factors: (1) expert testimony as to possible 
causes; (2) if the accident occurred shortly after the sale of the prod-
uct in a "new" condition; (3) whether the same accident occurred in 
similar products; (4) the elimination of other causes of the accident; 
and (5) whether the type of accident is one that occurs without a 
defect.94 . 
Expert testimony is only required when the subject of the inference 
is so particularly related to a science or profession that it is beyond the 
understanding of the average layperson.95 Expert testimony was not 
required on the issue of whether a product warning "gets its message 
across to an average person."96 As discussed in Virgil v. Kash N' Kany 
Service Corp.,97 no expert testimony was given to support why the plain-
tiff's three-month-old thermos imploded after she poured hot coffee 
into it.98 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated: 
Expert testimony is hardly necessary to establish that a ther-
mos bottle that explodes or implodes when coffee and milk 
are poured into it is defective. When a product fails to meet 
the reasonable expectation of the user, "the inference is that 
there was some sort of a defect, a precise definition of which 
is unnecessary."99 
product was defective at the time it was manufactured. [d. at 53, 549 A.2d 
at 391. 
91. jensen, 50 Md. App. at 232, 437 A.2d at 242. 
92. Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., 2000 WL 1690183, at *2 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying 
Maryland law). 
93. Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 51,549 A.2d at 390. 
94. [d.; see also PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, § 103 at 673-74 (4th ed. 1971). 
95. Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 31, 484 A.2d at 656. 
96. Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1243, 1304 (D.D.C. 1982) 
("The Court can think of no question more appropriately left to a common 
sense lay judgment than that of whether a written warning gets its message 
across to an average person."). 
97. See supra notes 40-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Virgil. 
98. Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 27, 484 A.2d at 654. 
99. [d. at 31, 484 A.2d at 656 (quoting Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 
(Or. 1967)). 
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Thus, the appellant's testimonylOO regarding her purchase of the ther-
mos and her subsequent use of the product gave rise to a reasonable 
inference that the thermos was defective when she acquired it. 101 
Although Maryland has not yet had occasion to consider adoption 
of the Restatement (Third), the Fourth Circuit used the principles enun-
ciated therein in an unpublished decision applying Maryland law, 
Riley v. De'Longhi Corp.102 In Riley, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer 
of a six-month-old portable heater that had been used only three 
times, alleging that a defect in it ignited a fire in their home. 103 The 
plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the most probable cause of the 
fire was a failure inside the heater.104 The defendant challenged that 
this testimony did not suffice as expert testimony as to possible 
causes105 because the expert "failed to identifY a precise defect within 
the heater."106 The court, relying on section 3, comment c of the Re-
statement (Third), stated that the expert's inability to identifY a precise 
defect was not fatal to the plaintiffs' case because, in a circumstantial 
case,107 the "plaintiff need not explain specifically what constituent 
part of the product failed. "108 Thus, it appears that the Fourth Circuit 
has made an initial step in accepting the concept of inferential evi-
dence of product defects set forth in section 3 of the Restatement 
(Third). 
4. Section 4: Noncompliance and Compliance with Product Safety 
Statutes or Regulations 
In connection with liability for defective design or inade-
quate instructions or warnings: 
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product 
safety statute or administrative regulation renders the 
100. Mrs. Virgil testified that she had bought the thermos several months prior 
to the implosion and denied dropping it or misusing, abusing, or damaging 
it in any way. Id. at 27, 484 A.2d at 654. . 
101. Id. at 33, 484 A.2d at 657. 
102. Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., 2000 WL 1690183, at *2 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying 
Maryland law). 
103. Id. at *1. 
104. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs' expert contended that the fire was caused by an 
electrical malfunction within the heater's control panel and its attached 
wiring. Id. 
105. This issue raised by the defendant-manufacturer goes to the first element in 
determining whether a product defect may be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence as set forth in Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 50, 
549 A.2d 385, 390 (1998). See supra text accompanying note 94 for five 
factors set forth in Harrison. 
106. Riley, 2000 WL 1690183, at *3. 
107. The court reasoned that the use of circumstantial proof of defect was ap-
propriate in this case because the heater sustained such severe damage that 
"direct evidence may not be available." Id. at *2 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 3 cmt. b). 
108. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 3 cmt. c). 
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product defective with respect to the risks sought to be 
reduced by the statute or regulation; and 
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product 
safety statute or administrative regulation is properly 
considered in determining whether a product is defec-
tive with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by 
the statute or regulation, but such compliance does 
not preclude as a matter of law a rmding of product 
defect. 109 
a. Noncompliance with a Safety Statute or Regulation 
293 
Section 4(a) provides that a design defect or a warnings defect nec-
essarily exists if there has been a violation of an applicable safety stat-
ute or regulation. 
There is no reported Maryland appellate court decision addressing 
whether there is a design defect or warning defect per se if the manu-
facturer has violated an applicable safety statute. The Maryland cases 
to date dealing with violation of safety statutes have been in the con-
text of negligence causes of action, and even then not in cases involv-
ing the sale of a product. llo Under longstanding general negligence 
precedents in Maryland, however, violation of a statute is not negli-
gence per se, but rather "some evidence" of negligence if three require-
ments are met. Ill First, the plaintiff must be a member of the class 
the statute was designed to protect; second, the injury suffered must 
be of the type the statute was designed to prevent; and third, the viola-
tion must be a proximate cause of the injuryY2 
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4. 
110. In Hammond v. Robins, the plaintiffs were injured when a dog ran in front of 
the heavy duty tandem bicycle they were riding, causing them to swerve and 
the bike to topple. Hammond v. Robins, 60 Md. App. 430, 433, 483 A.2d 
379, 380 (1984). The defendant and owner of the dog had not complied 
with the Carroll County Code requiring dogs be kept under restraint. [d. at 
435, 483 A.2d at 381. The court acknowledged that violation of a statutory 
duty establishes a prima facie case of negligence only where the violation is 
the proximate cause of the accident or injury. [d. The court clarified, how-
ever, that such a violation does not constitute negligence per se. [d. See also 
infra note III for a discussion of a similar case. 
111. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 362, 517 A.2d 1122,1132 
(1986). In Pahanish, the plaintiff sued the operator of a horse stable for 
negligence after being injured on one its trails. [d. at 348, 517 A.2d at 1125. 
The plaintiff claimed that the lower court erred in failing to find that the 
owner's violation of certain statutory licensing and inspection stipulations 
established a prima facie case of negligence. [d. at 361, 517 A.2d at 1132. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated that the violation of a 
statute does not constitute negligence per se, rather it may be considered 
evidence of negligence so long as three requirements were met. [d. at 362, 
517 A.2d at 1132; see also infra note 112 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the three requirements for a prima facie case of negligence based 
on the violation of a statutory duty. 
112. Pahanish, 69 Md. App. at 362, 517 A.2d at 1132; see also MPJI 19:7. 
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It is unclear whether Maryland courts would conclude that a viola-
tion of an applicable safety statute or regulation constitutes conclusive 
proof of the existence of a defect, as opposed to mere evidence of a 
possible defect. The Reporter's Note in section 4 of the Restatement 
(Third) states that common-law negligence principles in some states, 
such as Maryland, treat a violation of an applicable safety statute or 
regulation as mere evidence, but not conclusive proof, of negli-
genceY3 The Restatement (Third), however, subscribes to the rule of 
"the overwhelming majority of American courts"1l4 that, in cases in-
volving both design and failure to warn, violations of product safety 
regulations cause products to be defective as a matter of lawY5 
b. Compliance with a Safety Statute or Regulation 
Maryland law is generally in accord with the principle enunciated in 
section 4(b), which states that compliance with statutes or regulations 
governing product designs or warnings does not preclude, as a matter 
of law, a finding of product defect. Maryland provides, however, that 
such a legal preclusion of defectiveness may arise in some circum-
stancesY6 For example, in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.,1l7 the 
plaintiff was wearing a flannel nightgown inside-out when it ignited 
after she was standing near the front burner of her electric stove. I IS 
She was severely burned as a resultY9 In her products liability suit 
against the fabric manufacturer, the trial judge refused to admit evi-
dence of the Flammable Fabrics Act. 120 In holding the evidence ad-
missible, the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that although 
compliance with a statutory standard suggests due care, it does not 
preclude a finding of negligence due to failure to take additional pre-
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. d, rptr. n. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. See, e.g., Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005 
(1993); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 
(1985); see almTroja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 116,488 
A.2d 516, 523 (1985) (holding that harmless error occurred when expert 
testimony by defendant was admitted after plaintiff introduced that the 
product was in compliance with statues, regulations, and industry prac-
tices). Cf Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F. Supp. 857, 862 (D. Md. 1991) (follow-
ing accepted industry standards, even if counsel has urged a more cautious 
approach, is not reckless conduct for a manufacturer to follow). 
117. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985). 
118. Id. at 586, 495 A.2d at 350. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 602, 495 A.2d at 359. Although the manufacturer exceeded the re-
quirements imposed by statute, plaintiff wished to introduce evidence that 
the "incidence and severity of burns caused by ignition of clothing that was 
subject to the Federal standard" in an attempt to overcome the inference 
that clothing manufactured in compliance with the standard was not unrea-
sonably dangerous. Id. 
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cautions. 121 The court asserted that this rule was similar in strict liabil-
ity cases, where proof of compliance with a product statutory standard 
does not prevent a judgment of defectiveness.122 
Similarly, in Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc.,123 a tort action against 
three corporate defendants responsible for designing, manufacturing, 
and selling an automobile "Lift Kit" device installed on an automobile 
that was later involved in a two-car collision, the court asserted that 
compliance with a statute does not necessarily preclude a finding of 
negligence or product defectiveness where a reasonable person would 
take precautions beyond the statutorily required measure. 124 The 
court expanded their holding beyond the principle of section 4(b), 
however, declaring that a legal preclusion of defectiveness as a matter 
of law may arise from compliance in some circumstances.125 Mter re-
viewing evidence that the defendants complied with standards of the 
Transportation Article regarding vehicle bumper heights, the court 
held that "where no special circumstances require extra caution, a 
court may find that conformity to the statutory standard amounts to 
due care as a matter of law."126 Thus, while Maryland law is in accord 
with the general principle set forth in section 4(b), if there are no 
special circumstances requiring additional caution, then a court may 
hold that statutory compliance indicates due care or lack of defective-
ness as a matter of law. 
B. Liability Rules Applicable to Special Products or Product Markets 
1. Section 5: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Product 
Components for Harm Caused by Products into Which Compo-
nents are Integrated 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing product components who sells or distributes a compo-
nent is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by a product into which the component is integrated 
if: 
(a) the component is defective in itself, as dermed in this 
Chapter, and the defect causes the harm; or 
(b) (1) the seller or distributor of the component substan-
tially participates in the integration of the compo-
nent into the design of the product; and 
121. [d. at 602, 495 A.2d at 358. 
122. [d. 
123. 330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). 
124. [d. at 729,743,625 A.2d at 1007, 1014 ("Our cases recognize, however, that 
compliance with a statute does not necessarily preclude a finding of negli-
gence or product defectiveness where a reasonable person would take pre-
cautions beyond the statutorily required measure."). 
125. [d. at 743-44, 625 A.2d at 1014. 
126. [d. 
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(2) the integration of the component causes the prod-
uct to be defective, as def'med in this Chapter; and 
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.127 
Section 5 is founded on the fundamental policy that component 
sellers should not be liable when the component itself is not defective. 
Subsection (b) sets forth a three-prong test that plaintiffs must meet 
before holding a component-part manufacturer strictly liable for par-
ticipating in the design of the integrated product. 128 
Although there are no reported Maryland decisions on this topic, 
the policy underlying section 5(a) is consistent with Maryland's gen-
eral approach to products liability law. Maryland courts impose liabil-
ity only on those in the distribution chain who either caused or at least 
are in a position to reasonably detect the defect that caused the 
harm.129 
Maryland case law and the Restatement (Second), however, are less in-
structive regarding section 5 (b). Although there is no fully compara-
ble section to 5(b), section 395 in the Restatement (Second/ 30 addresses 
the liability of component-part manufacturers but not a comparable 
standard for substantial participation. 131 
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5. 
128. Id. § 5(b) (1)-(3). 
129. See, e.~ Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 549 A.2d 385 
(1988); see supra note 90 for a more detailed description of the facts of 
Harrison. The Harrisons initiated a products liability action against the car 
dealership to recover damages after the used car they bought from the de-
fendant caught fire. Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 44, 549 A.2d at 387. The 
court held that dealers of used products should not, in most instances, be 
held strictly liable for defects created by the manufacturer of a product sold 
in a used condition by the dealer. Id. at 55-56, 549 A.2d at 392-93. In dicta, 
the Hamson court suggested that the liability of a dealer of used products 
should be limited to defects created in the product by the dealer, or per-
haps to situations where the dealer knew or should have known of the exis-
tence of the manufacturing defect. Id. at 55, 549 A.2d at 392. 
130. Section 395 of the Restatement (Second), entitled "Negligent Manufacture of 
Chattel Dangerous Unless Carefully Made" states: 
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manu-
facture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recog-
nize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to 
those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should 
expect it to be used and to those whom he should expect to be 
endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a pur-
pose for which it is supplied. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 395. 
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 395 rptr. n. Reporter's Note m, titled "Manu-
facturer of raw material or parts of article to be assembled by a third per-
son" states in part: "A manufacturer of parts to be incorporated in the 
product of his buyer or others is subject to liability under the Section if they 
are so negligently made as to render the products in which they are incor-
porated unreasonably dangerous for use." Id. 
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Maryland courts have not interpreted section 395 of the Restatement 
(Second) regarding liability of component product manufacturers for 
harm caused by the products into which the components are inte-
grated. Thus, there is no indication what the trend in Maryland might 
be. Decisions of other courts are instructive of how Maryland courts 
may treat the issues associated with section 5 (b) of the Restatement 
(Third). 132 
2. Section 6: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm 
Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices 
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical de-
vice who sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug 
or medical device is subject to liability for harm to per-
sons caused by the defect. A prescription drug or 
medical device is one that may be legally sold or other-
wise distributed only pursuant to a health-care pro-
vider's prescription. 
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a pre-
scription drug or medical device is defective if at the 
time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical 
device: 
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as dermed in Sec-
tion 2(a); or 
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as 
dermed in Subsection (c); or 
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instruc-
tions or warnings as dermed in Subsection (d). 
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasona-
bly safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the drug or medical device are suffi-
ciently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic 
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, know-
ing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, 
would not prescribe the drug or medical device for 
any class of patients. 
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasona-
bly safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings if 
132. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Lit., 996 F. Supp. 
1110,1116-17 (D. Ala. 1997) (stating that technical service assistance and 
advice provided by component manufacturer did not constitute such sub-
stantial participation in the design of the integrated products as would sub-
ject a component manufacturer to potential liability if those products were 
shown to be defective); Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712,716 
(R.I. 1999) (adopting the Restatement (Third) approach that the manufac-
turer or seller of a component part may be liable to the ultimate user, par-
ticularly if it substantially partiCipated in the integration of the component 
into the design of the final product). 
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reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foresee-
able risks of harm are not provided to: 
(I) prescribing and other health-care providers who 
are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in 
accordance with the instructions or warnings; or 
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has 
reason to know that health-care providers will not 
be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in ac-
cordance with the instructions or warnings. 
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription 
drug or medical device is subject to liability for harm 
caused by the drug or device if: (1) at the time of sale 
or other distribution the drug or medical device con-
tains a manufacturing defect as dermed in Section 
2(a); or (2) at or before the time of sale or other distri-
bution of the drug or medical device the retail seller 
or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care 
and such failure causes harm to persons.133 
Prescription drugs and medical devices entail weighing unique risks 
and benefits-what may be.harmful to one patient may be beneficial 
to another. Section 6(a) of the Restatement (Third) is the general provi-
sion imposing liability on the manufacturer of a defective prescription 
drug or medical device.134 
The following three subsections refine when liability for a defect is 
to be imposed on a manufacturer of a prescribed drug or medical 
device. Such a product is defective if, at the time of its distribution, it: 
(1) deviates from its intended design, despite using all possible 
care;135 (2) is created from a defective design making it unreasonably 
safe, such that the foreseeable harm is sufficiently great in comparison 
to its foreseeable benefit that reasonable health-care providers, know-
ing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not pre-
scribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients;l36 or (3) 
fails to adequately warn or instruct its users, which occurs when rea-
sonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm 
are not provided to either (a) health-care providers in a position to 
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6. 
134. Id. § 6(a). 
135. Id. § 6(b) (1). 
136. Id. § 6(b)(2), (c). Because of the special nature of prescription drugs and 
medical devices, section 6(c) provides a special standard for determining 
their design-defect liability rather than the more general test for design 
defect under section 2(b). REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b. See supra text 
accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2(b). See also supra notes 51-
51 and accompanying text for a discussion of design defects. Under section 
6(c), a prescription drug or medical device is defectively designed only 
when it provides no net benefit to any class of patients. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) !:i 6 cmt. b. 
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reduce the risks of harm,137 or (b) to the patient, when the manufac-
turer has reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a 
position to reduce the risk of harm.138 
The last subsection of section 6 imposes liability on the retailer or 
other distributor of a defective, prescription drug or medical device. 
Section 6(e) provides that a retailer or other distributor of a prescrip-
tion drug or device that causes harm may be liable if it contains a 
manufacturing defect139 when it is distributed140 or if, at or before 
distribution, the retailer or distributor fails to exercise reasonable 
care, causing injury to others.141 
Maryland has not had the opportunity to consider defective pre-
scription drug or medical devices cases that would implicate section 6 
of the REstatement (Third). Drawing analogies to similar products liabil-
ity cases and reviewing the approaches taken by other jurisdictions, 
however, leads to a better understanding of whether Maryland courts 
will adopt section 6. 
a. Manufacturer's Liability for Prescription Drugs or Medical Devices with 
Manufacturing Defects 
There are no Maryland cases addressing the liability of a manufac-
turer of a defectively manufactured prescription drug or medical 
device. 
b. Manufacturer's Liability for Prescription Drugs or Medical Devices with 
Design Defects 
Although there are no Maryland appellate decisions on point, other 
jurisdictions traditionally have refused imposing tort liability for defec-
tive design of prescription drugs and medical devices.142 The objective 
standard to show defective design under section 6(b)(2) is "very de-
manding;" liability is imposed "only under unusual circumstances."143 
Decisions refusing to impose strict liability for design defects of pre-
scription drugs or medical devices are rooted in the "unavoidably un-
137. 
138. 
139. 
140. 
141. 
142. 
143. 
[d. § 6(b)(3), (d)(I). 
[d. § 6(b)(3), (d)(2). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a) (defining the manufacturing defect). See 
supra text accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2(a). See also supra 
notes 17-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of manufacturing de-
fects, generally under section 2(a). See supra notes 20-20 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Maryland's adoption of application of strict 
liability for a manufactUring defect. See supra notes 27-37 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Maryland plaintiffs' burden to prove defect, at-
tribution, and causation. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Maryland's reconsideration of degree and lessening of the 
evidence necessary for plaintiffs to recover for a manufacturing defect. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) S 6(e) (1). 
[d. § 6(e)(2). 
[d. § 6 cmt. b. 
[d. § 6 cmt. f. 
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safe product" exception in the Restatement (Second).144 To determine 
whether a drug or product is considered unavoidably unsafe, two ap-
proaches have developed. One is to insulate all prescription drugs 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) .145 The sec-
ond is to determine eligibility for immunity on an individual basis, 
looking at the drug and the circumstances. 146 
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. k. Comment k states: 
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in 
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of be-
ing made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are espe-
cially common in the field of drugs. 
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of 
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging 
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably 
leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the 
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high 
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly pre-
pared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not 
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of 
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this 
very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under 
the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many 
new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and 
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no as-
surance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such 
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such 
products, again with the qualification that they are properly pre-
pared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situa-
tion calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate 
consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable 
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. 
Id. Maryland expressly adopted comment k in Miles Lab. Inc. v. Doe, 315 
Md. 704, 732-33, 556 A.2d 1107, 1121 (1989) (certifying that Maryland im-
plicitly adopted comment k in Phipps, and permitted recovery from the 
commercial preparer and supplier of a blood product based on strict liabil-
ity in tort, where, assertedly as a result of receipt of the blood product, the 
recipient was infected with the AIDS virus). 
145. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). 
146. See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Labs., 112 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987). This approach 
is problematic because jurors may challenge the FDA's approval of the drug 
by deciding whether it would have been reasonable to prescribe the drug or 
device to any class of patients. If they determine that it would not be, then 
they will have concluded, in effect, that the product should not have been 
marketed at all. This determination contradicts the FDA's finding, which is 
made after thorough risk-benefit analysis. Given this complication, courts 
applying this approach have determined that a judge is to make the deter-
mination of whether comment k immunity is applicable to a particular de-
fendant and that determination is to be made at an evidentiary hearing 
outside of the presence of the jury. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 
718 P.2d 1318, 1326-27 (Kan. 1986) (determining that trial judge should 
have heard evidence on issue outside presence of jury and made ruling 
thereon); Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (excepting drug from strict liability design-defect analysis can only be 
made after evidence is taken out of jury's presence and relevant factors 
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The design-defect standard focuses on the drug or device at issue, 
not on other experimental or approved products that an expert wit-
ness believes are safer or reasonable alternatives.147 As such, a drug or 
device is not defective simply because an alternative product is said to 
present fewer risks. 
c. Manufacturer's Liability for Inadequately Instructing or Warning About 
Risks Associated with Prescription Drugs or Medical Devices 
The traditional "learned intermediary" rule, requiring the manufac-
turer to warn the prescribing health-care provider, rather than the 
patient, about risks attendant to the use of prescription drugs and 
medical devices, is embodied in section 6.148 Section 6(d), however, 
also recognizes that, in some limited circumstances, the manufacturer 
has a duty to warn the patient directly, rather than the health-care 
provider. 149 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not expressly addressed 
whether Maryland should adopt the learned intermediary doctrine in 
a strict liability case.150 In Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., however, 
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland saw no 
reason to conclude that Maryland courts would not adopt the 
doctrine.151 
In Fellows, the plaintiff alleged that USV Pharmaceutical Corp. 
("USV'), a drug manufacturer, was strictly liable for injuries suffered 
from the side effects of taking Doriden, a drug prescribed for insom-
nia. 152 Upon granting USVs summary judgment motion,153 the court 
stated: 
147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
Although the Maryland courts have not yet addressed the ef-
fect of comment k on section 402A, this court has been 
presented with no evidence suggesting that they would not 
follow the approach of other courts that have decided the 
issue. These and numerous other cases have held that pre-
considered). Another court has determined that whether a product is im-
mune from liability under comment k is a question for the judge if reasona-
ble minds could reach only one conclusion. Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & 
Co., 546 A.2d 775, 783 (R.I. 1988). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(b) (1). 
Id. § 6(d) (1); see also id. § 6(b) (3); Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 
1245 (NJ. 1999) (defining learned intermediary doctrine). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6(d)(2); see also id. § 6(b)(3), cmt. b. 
Cf Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 522-23, 276 A.2d 36, 40 (1971) (implicitly 
creating the learned intermediary doctrine in Maryland in a case decided 
before Maryland adopted Restatement (Second) section 402A strict liability 
principles); Miller v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838 (D. 
Md. 2000) (acknowledging Maryland's recognition of the learned interme-
diary doctrine). 
502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1980). 
Id. at 298. 
Id. at 301. 
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scription drugs are not considered unusually dangerous 
under section 402A, and the manufacturer will not incur lia-
bility under that section unless the manufacturer has failed 
to provide adequate warnings of the drug's possible dangers. 
The audience to whom these warnings must be directed is 
the medical community, not the consuming public. Since 
there is no dispute regarding the adequacy of USV's warn-
ings to the medical community, as well as to [the prescribing 
physician], USV is not liable to plaintiff under section 402A 
as a matter of law.154 
In Werner v. Upjohn CO.,155 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit stated that it was adequate for a drug manufacturer 
to avoid liability for marketing a new drug that, although beneficial, 
was unavoidably dangerous if a warning was included regarding the 
drug's known side effects.156 The court stated: 
Any remaining distinction in theories [between negligence 
and strict liability] disappears when a failure to warn case in-
volves an unavoidably dangerous drug which the product in 
this case admittedly was. The Restatement of Torts (Second) 
[section] 402A, comment k makes it clear that a drug manu-
facturer is not to be held strictly liable for injuries caused by 
an unavoidably dangerous new drug if the warning is ade-
quate. The standard for liability under strict liability and 
negligence is essentially the same. 157 
154. Id. at 300 (citations omitted). 
155. 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying Maryland law and comment k 
of the Restatement (Second) section 402A). The plaintiff, Jack Werner, 
brought this action to recover damages for injuries received from taking 
Cleocin, a prescribed broad-spectrum antibiotic manufactured by Upjohn. 
Id. at 851. Cleocin was approved by the FDA for general use in 1970, and 
was popular for persons allergic to penicillin. Id. After use of the drug 
increased, Up john received reports of side effects such as diarrhea and coli-
tis, which were reported to the FDA, and resulted in studies performed 
independently and in-house by Upjohn. Id. As a result of the studies, the 
warnings associated with the drug were frequently revised, and in 1974, a 
letter was mailed to every physician in the United States warning physicians 
of the side effects' of the drug and recommended treatment if they arise. 
Id. at 852. The warning stated, in part: "severe and persistent diarrhea, 
which may be accompanied by blood and mucus, and which may be associ-
ated with changes in large bowel mucosa diagnosed as 'pseudomembra-
nous colitis,' has been reported in association of Cleocin HCI (clindamycin 
HCI hydrate)." Id. It further stated warning signs, and recommended 
treatment if the warning signs occur. Id. Upjohn updated the warning 
again in 1975, which expanded upon the earlier version and recommended 
that Cleocin be "reserved for serious infections where less toxic antimicro-
bial agents are inappropriate." Id. at 853. The warning also stated side 
effects, other limitations on prescribing the drug, proposed treatment if the 
side effects manifest, and other drugs that may prolong or worsen the con-
dition. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 858. 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court is the only court to date that has 
adopted section 6(d)(2) of the Restatement (Third). In Perez v. Wyeth 
Laboratories Inc.,15S the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
learned intermediary doctrineI59 does not apply to direct marketing 
of prescription drugs to consumers.160 It is appropriate to impose a 
duty on the manufacturer to warn the patient directly because situa-
tions may exist when the health-care provider assumes a "much-dimin-
ished role as an evaluator or decision maker."16I Thus, under the 
Restatement (Third), "warnings may have to be provided to a health-care 
provider or even to the patient," depending on the circumstances.162 
d. Liability of Retailer or Distributor of Prescribed Drug or Medical Device for 
Harm Caused by Defect Existing Before or After the Sale 
Maryland courts have not addressed a case with facts to which sec-
tion 6(e) would apply. Analogies can be drawn, however, from Mary-
land's current treatment of retailers. 
Normally, a retailer is a "conduit" between the manufacturer and 
the customer; the seller "ordinarily has no duty in negligence to dis-
cover the defects or dangers of a particular product."163 Where the 
seller is more than a mere "conduit," however, a supplier-installer de-
fendant may be liable because he "should have known" of the prod-
ucts dangers. 164 Generally, ordinary retailers are protected because 
the responsibility of detecting potential defects would be too onerous 
a task. 165 Retail vendors of prescription drugs and medical devices, 
however, must exercise reasonable care, which includes following 
manufacturers' warnings and relaying those warnings to their custom-
158. 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999). This case was a consolidated action in Middle-
sex County, New Jersey with twenty-five Norplant cases involving approxi-
mately fifty Norplant users. Id. at 1248. 
159. See supra text accompanying note 148 for a definition of the learned inter-
mediary doctrine. 
160. Perez., 734 A.2d at 1257. 
161. Id. at 1253. 
162. [d. 
163. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 326 Md.179, 202, 604 A.2d 445, 455 (1992). 
164. [d. at 198-99, 604 A.2d at 454-56. "Reason to know" and "should know" are 
terms of art in the Restatement (Second). "Reason to know" means that the 
actor of reasonable intelligence would infer that a defect, in fact, exists 
(strict liability). "Should know" means that the actor of reasonable intelli-
gence would discover the defect in the course of his ordinary duty, in light 
of his peculiar experience dealing with such products (negligence). See id. 
at 20~4, 604 A.2d at 457. Defendants properly exercising their ordinary 
duty to inspect are not liable under a "should have known" negligence stan-
dard. See Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 305 
(1965) (holding that liability could only be imposed on defendant-car 
dealer if defect could have been discovered through the exercise of reason-
able care); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 305-06, 336 A.2d 
118, 128 (1975) (same). 
165. See Frericks, 274 Md. at 305, 336 A.2d at 128. 
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ers/patients. Given the disparity in financial resources of pharmacies 
and medical suppliers, from the super-store to the corner store, it 
would be unfair to impose strict liability upon retailers when the man-
ufacturers' resources are more abundant.166 
3. Section 7: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm 
Caused by Defective Food Products 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing food products who sells or distributes a food product 
that is defective under § 2, § 3, or § 4 is subject to liability 
for hann to persons or property caused by the defect. 
Under § 2(a), a hann-causing ingredient of the food product 
constitutes a defect if a reasonable consumer would not ex-
pect the food product to contain that ingredient.167 
Section 7 provides that liability for harm caused by defective, com-
mercially distributed food products should be determined under the 
same rules generally applicable to non-food products. For example, 
the presence of a foreign object in food, such as a pebble in a can of 
peas, may readily be handled as a manufacturing defect under section 
2(a). Food product cases, however, may also present unique ques-
tions of whether food is defective where the foreign matter that 
caused the harm naturally occurs in the thing being consumed, such 
as a shell in a crabcake or a blood vessel in a chicken wing. To resolve 
this indeterminacy, section 7 adopts the majority rule that applies a 
reasonable consumer-expectation test for purposes of determining 
whether a manufacturing defect exists under section 2(a).168 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, pre-
dicting that Maryland appellate courts would impose liability on the 
food distributor, has applied a reasonable consumer-expectation test 
to determine whether the defect in the food fell below reasonable 
consumer expectations.169 
166. Id. The Maryland General Assembly has codified the principle in section 5-
311 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, 
the purpose of which "is to make the chickens of poor design come home 
to roost with the manufacturer, not the retailer." Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F. 
Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1991); MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
3ll(b) (1989). 
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 7. 
168. Id. § 7 cmt. b. 
169. Id.; Yang Cha Hong v. Marriott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (D. Md. 
1987). 
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a. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland Imposes-
Reasonable Expectation 
In Yong Cha Hong v. Marriott COrp.,170 the court addressed whether 
the manufacturer and seller were liable for defects in the manufacture 
of food products, manifested by harm caused by the presence of an 
ingredient not intended by the product seller. l71 The suit arose when 
the plaintiff, while eating a fried chicken wing, bit into what she per-
ceived to be a worm, which was actually either the chicken's trachea or 
a major blood vesseI,172 The plaintiff sued Marriott Corp., the propri-
etor of the restaurant, and Gold Kist, the store's chicken supplier, for 
negligence and breach of warranty.173 Defending against plaintiffs 
summary judgment motion, the proprietor and supplier contended 
that breach of warranty only occurs if the offending item was a "for-
eign object," not part of the chicken itself. 174 
Mter reviewing the law in other jurisdictions, the statement of law 
in the Uniform Commercial Code hornbook, and the characteristics 
of fried chicken,175 the court concluded that when the item discov-
ered in the food object is a natural item that could be "reasonably 
170. 656 F. Supp. 445 (D. Md. 1987). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 447. Based on the Strasburger and Siegel Certificate of Analysis intro-
duced into evidence it could have been the aorta. /d. 
173. Id. at 446. Strict liability was not alleged in Yang Cha Hong. Under the 
functional defect principles enunciated in the Restatement (Third), however, 
the legal theory on which the claimant proceeds would have no bearing on 
the test to be used for determining whether a defect existed. An injured 
person was formerly precluded from bringing a breach of warranty claim 
against a restaurant owner under implied warranty that its food is of mer-
chantable quality and fit for human consumption. See Child's Dining Hall 
Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 493, 197 A. 105, 106 (1938) (recovering from 
injuries from eating bread containing tin at defendant's restaurant pre-
cluded unless negligence shown, as supplying food in a restaurant is ser-
vice, where there is no implied warranty). Section 2-314(2) of the 
Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code supercedes this holding, 
whereby the "U[niform] C[ommercial] C[ode] warranty of merchantability 
applies to sales of food in restaurants, including take-out sales." Yang Cha 
Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 447 n. 3 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw § 2-
314(2) (1975». 
174. Yang Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 447. Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) 
examines the difficulty of food product cases when it is unclear whether the 
ingredient that caused the plaintiff's harm is truly a manufacturing defect 
or is an inherent aspect of the product. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) !§ 7 cmt. 
b. The Restatement claims that this problem stems from the fact that food 
products usually do not have "specific product designs that may be used as 
a basis for determining whether the offending product ingredient consti-
tutes a departure from design, and is thus a manufacturing defect." Id. In 
order to resolve this problem, some courts have relied on a distinction be-
tween "foreign" and "natural" characteristics of food products to determine 
liability. Id. Under this test, a commercial seller or distributor is only liable 
for harm-causing foreign objects in the food product. 
175. Yang Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 447-49. 
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expected in the dish by its very nature under the prevailing expecta-
tion of the reasonable consumer,"176 then the dish is merchantable 
and the plain tiff' s recovery is denied. I77 In many jurisdictions, this 
standard, known as the "reasonable expectation" test, has displaced 
the natural/foreign distinction proffered by the defendants. I7s 
Considering the foregoing, as well as a previous Court of Appeals of 
Maryland opinion,I79 the federal district court was "confident that Ma-
ryland would apply the 'reasonable expectation' rule to this warranty 
case .... "ISO Because the presence of a trachea or large aorta in fast-
food fried chicken was not clearly reasonably expected to render it 
merchantable as a matter of law, the court denied the defendant's 
summary judgment motion in order to allow a jury to determine the 
issue. lSI 
b. Court of Appeals of Maryland's Predecessor to Yong Cha Hong 
In Bryer v. Bath Packing CO.,IS2 a girl was injured by eating a small 
chicken bone found in chow me in at the school cafeteria with chicken 
from "Ready to Serve Boned Chicken"Is3 in sealed, packaged cans. IS4 
The court stated, "warranty is one of merchantable quality or fitness 
for the general purpose for which the goods are sold which, in food 
cases, means reasonably fit and safe for human consumption."IS5 Be-
cause the canned chicken was purported to be boneless, and, given 
that chow mein would be difficult to guard against bones, the court 
held that the trier of fact would likely find that chicken bones in the 
chow mein were "something that should not be there."IS6 
4. Section 8: Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Defec-
tive Used Products 
176. 
177. 
178. 
179. 
180. 
181. 
182. 
183. 
184. 
185. 
186. 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing used products who sells or distributes a defective used 
product is subject to liability for hann to persons or property 
caused by the defect if the defect: 
Id. at 448. This standard is the "reasonable expectation" test. 
Id. 
Id. 
Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 113, 156 A.2d 442, 447 (1959) 
(recognizing negligence claim for "something that should not be [in a pre-
pared food item]," which renders it unfit). See infra notes 182-182 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Bryer v. Rath Packing Co. 
Yong Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 448. 
Id. at 448-49. 
221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959). 
This was the advertisement on the can label. Id. at 107, 156 A.2d at 444. 
Id. at 107, 156 A.2d at 443-44. 
Id. at 108, 156 A.2d at 444. 
Id. at 113, 156 A.2d at 447. This statement suggests the consumer's reason-
able expectation test should be used to determine liability for a manufac-
turing defect in food products. 
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(a) arises from the seller's failure to exercise reasonable 
care; or 
(b) is a manufacturing defect under § 2(a) or a defect that 
may be inferred under § 3 and the seller's marketing 
of the product would cause a reasonable person in the 
position of the buyer to expect the used product to 
present no greater risk of defect than if the product 
were new; or 
(c)' is a defect under § 2 or § 3 in a used product 
remanufactured by the seller or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain or distribution of the used product; 
or 
(d) arises from a used product's noncompliance under § 4 
with a product safety statute or regulation applicable 
to the used product. 
A used product is a product that, prior to the time of sale or 
other distribution referred to in this Section, is commercially 
sold or otherwise distributed to a buyer not in the commer-
cial chain of distribution and used for some period of 
time.187 
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Section 8 of the Restatement (Third) sets forth when dealers selling or 
distributing used188 products that are defective should be liable for 
harm caused as a result. 189 Although the policy behind adopting prod-
ucts liability standards for sellers of used products differs from those 
who deal in new products, under special circumstances a seller of used 
goods may be subject to a claim in strict liability.190 For instance, 
when a dealer reviews and updates the used product, he may be liable 
for harm that results from a defect in the product.191 
Section 8(a) expands potential liability imposed upon commercial 
sellers and distributors of defective, used products resulting from the 
seller's failure to exercise reasonable care.192 This includes conduct 
by the seller that makes the products defective or allows defects to 
remain when reasonable care would have eliminated them. 193 Section 
8(b) of the Restatement (Third) specifically addresses distribution and 
dealership of used products, whereas the Restatement (Second) is 
silent.194 
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 8. 
188. See id. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. § 8 cmt. a. 
191. [d. The discounted price of the used product, when compared to a new 
product, does not relieve the seller of responsibility for such defects. [d. 
192. [d. § 8(a), cmt. a. 
193. [d. 
194. Compare [d. § 8(b) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. 
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a. Lesser Liability Imposed: Maryland s Liability of Commercial Seller of De-
fective Used Products Compared to Section 8 
Liability for sellers of used products set forth in section 8 of the 
Restatement (Third) is broader than the rule under current Maryland 
law. In Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, Inc.,l95 the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland held that dealers of used goods should not, in most 
instances, be strictly liable for defects created by the manufacturer.196 
In dicta, the court limited liability of dealers in used goods.to defects 
in the product created by the dealer, himself, or where the dealer 
knew or should have known of the existence of the manufacturing 
defect. 197 
b. The "Sealed Container" Defense Possibly Precludes Maryland's Adoption 
of Section 8(b) 
It is possible that a seller or distributor of used products deviating 
from their intended design198 may be immune from liability as a result 
of Maryland's statutory "sealed container" defense.199 Section 5-405 
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code 
provides in pertinent part: 
195. 
196. 
197. 
198. 
199. 
(b) It shall be a defense to an action against a seller of a 
product for property damage or personal injury alleg-
edly caused by the defective design or manufacturer 
77 Md. App. 41, 55, 549 A.2d 385, 392 (1988) (declining to impose strict 
liability on car dealership for defects in a used car causing plaintiff's inju-
ries); see also supra note 90 for a more thorough discussion of the facts and 
rules of law promulgated in Harrison. 
Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 55, 549 A.2d at 392. The court reviewed decisions 
of courts in other jurisdictions considering the same issue. See id. (citing 
Court v. Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281,282 (Ill. 1978) and Realmuto v. Straub 
Motors, Inc., 322 A.2d 440, 444 (NJ. 1974)). The Grzelinski court stated 
that, "to the extent that plaintiff alleges that the defects were created not 
only by the manufacturer, but also by work defectively done by the used car 
dealer, his complaint satisfies the requirements." Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d at 
282. 
Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 54-55, 549 A.2d at 392. The plaintiffs relied on res 
ipsa loquitor to support a finding of negligence from expert testimony that 
molten liquid does not normally fall from the bottom of the dashboard. [d. 
(citing Petrus Chrysler-Plymouth v. Davis, 671 S.W.2d 749 (Ark. 1984) for the 
"knew or should have known" standard, similar to the "failure to exercise 
reasonable care" standard in section 8(a)). The court dismissed this argu-
ment because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the elements of a strict 
liability claim. [d. at 51,549 A.2d at 389; see also supra note 40 and accom-
panying text for the elements required to prove a strict liability claim in 
Maryland as set forth Virgil. 
See supra note 11 and accompanying text for the text of section 2(a) of the 
Restatement (Third). 
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (2000); Reed v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 934 F. Supp. 713, 717-18 (D. Md. 1996) (discussing Maryland's 
"sealed container defense" when manufacturing defect in a new product 
alleged). 
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of a product if the seller establishes that: (1) The 
product was acquired and then sold or leased by the 
seller in a sealed container or in an unaltered form; 
(2) The seller had no knowledge of the defect; (3) 
The seller in the performance of the duties he per-
formed or while the product was in his possession 
could not have discovered the defect while exercising 
reasonable care; (4) The seller did not manufacture, 
produce, design, or designate the specifications for 
the product which conduct was the proximate and 
substantial cause of the claimant's injury; and (5) The 
seller did not alter, modify, assemble, or mishandle 
the product while in the seller's possession in a man-
ner which was the proximate and substantial cause of 
the claimant's injury.2oo 
(c) Use of this defense is limited if it would be inequitable 
to preclude liability, such as if a judgment cannot be 
enforced against the manufacturer; the manufacturer 
cannot be identified; or the seller made express war-
ranties, the breach of which resulted in the claimant's 
injuries.201 
309 
Although the sealed container defense has been considered in Ma-
ryland three times, all of them federal district court cases,202 it is un-
clear whether the mere fact that the product is used breaks the seal 
under the Maryland defense. 
III. CHAPTER 2: LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELL-
ERS NOT BASED ON PRODUCT DEFECTS AT TIME OF SALE 
A. Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor 
1. Section 9: Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor 
for Harm Caused by Misrepresentation 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products who, in connection with the sale of a product, 
makes a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresenta-
tion of material fact concerning the product is subject to lia-
200. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (b) (2000). 
201. [d. § 5-405(c). 
202. Richardson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 700, 704 (D. Md. 1997) 
(asserting sealed container defense properly limited to reinstatement provi-
sion requiring uncertainty of federal district court's jurisdiction until con-
clusion of case); Reed, 934 F. Supp. at 717 (limiting exceptions to the sealed 
container rule to those enumerated in the statute, including when express 
warranties have been made); Liesener v. Weslo, 775 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. 
Md. 1991) (applying the sealed container rule to insulate the seller from 
liability because the plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence that a judg-
ment against the manufacture is unenforceable). 
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bility for hann to persons or property caused by the 
misrepresentation. 203 
Section 9 of the Restatement (Third) addresses the liability of com-
mercial product sellers or distributors for harm caused by misrepre-
sentations that may be negligent, fraudulent, or innocent.204 Under 
this section, a plaintiff is not required to prove the product was defec-
tive at the time of its sale or distribution so long as the misrepresenta-
tion was material and the actual cause of the harm.205 Although the 
tort rule set forth in this section would not apply to mere economic 
loss caused by harm to the product itself,206 it will often overlap with 
an independent basis for recovery under a breach of express warranty 
theory under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Although section 9 of the Restatement (Third) has not been formally 
adopted, Maryland law is in general accord with this section.207 Thus, 
when the issue of negligent, fraudulent or innocent misrepresenta-
tion208 arises in Maryland, the courts decide these issues separately 
under existing case law and the Restatement (Second).209 
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 9. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. See infra note 352 and accompanying text for the text of RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 20. 
207. See, e.g., Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 756-57, 
556 A.2d 1126, 1133 (1989) (alleging negligent misrepresentation of prod-
uct qualities although absence of reliance defeated causation require-
ment); Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 307-08, 550 A.2d 389, 
401 (1988) (denying recovery for negligent misrepresentation as to the 
product's quality where buyer sustained only "economic loss," but recovery 
for breach of warranties allowed). See also MPJI 11:1 (deceit), 19:6 (negli-
gent misrepresentation), 26:6 (express warranty). 
208. "Liability for innocent product misrepresentation is stated in the Restate-
ment, Second, of Torts Section 402B." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 9 cmt. b. 
The issue of misrepresentation in advertising under section 402B of the 
Restatement (Second) was raised by the plaintiff in Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy 
Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 539 A.2d 701 (1988) in the circuit court, but the 
presiding judge granted the defendants' motion for judgment on this issue 
which was subsequently not raised on appeal. Ziegler, 74 Md. App. at 615, 
539 A.2d at 702. 
209. Fraudulent misrepresentation may be resolved under the tort of deceit. To 
prove deceit in Maryland, a litigant must show: (1) that the representation 
made is false; (2) that its falsity was either known to the speaker or the 
misrepresentation was made with such reckless indifference to truth as to 
be the equivalent to actual knowledge; (3) that it was made for the purpose 
of defrauding the person claiming to be i~ured thereby; (4) that such per-
son both relied upon the misrepresentation and had a right to rely upon it, 
fully believing its truth; (5) that he would have not acted, and the resulting 
injury not have been caused, had the misrepresentation not been made; 
and (6) actual damages resulted as a direct result of the fraudulent misrep-
resentation. See Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 333, 439 
A.2d 534, 536 (1982); Gittings v. VonDorn, 136 Md. 10, 15-16, 109 A. 553, 
554 (1920); Additionally, "an intermediate seller who provides false or de-
ceptive information to a consumer is directly liable under the Consumer 
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2. Section 10: Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor 
for Harm Caused by Post-Sale Failure to Warn 
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise 
distributing products is subject to liability for hann to 
persons or property caused by the seller's failure to 
provide a warning after the time of sale or distribution 
of a product if a reasonable person in the seller's posi-
tion would provide such a warning. 
(b) A reasonable person in the seller's position would pro-
vide a warning after the time of sale if: 
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that 
the product poses a substantial risk of hann to 
persons or property; and 
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can 
be identified and can reasonably be assumed to be 
unaware of the risk of hann; and 
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and 
acted on by those to whom a warning might be 
provided; and 
(4) the risk of hann is sufficiently geat to justify the 
burden of providing a warning. 10 
Section 10 of the Restatement (Third) places a duty on a product's 
manufacturer, seller, or distributor to warn consumers of a product 
where the producer discovers after its sale that the product poses a 
substantial risk of harm.211 Failure to provide such a warning results 
Protection Act." Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 544, 667 
A.2d 624, 637 (1994). To prove negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff 
must show: (1) that the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, 
negligently asserted a false statement; (2) that the defendant intended the 
plaintiff to act upon his statement; (3) that the defendant knew the plaintiff 
would probably rely on the statement, which if erroneous, would cause loss 
or injury; (4) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation; 
and (5) that the Plaintiff suffered proximate damages as a result. See Weis-
man v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783, (1988); Martens Chevrolet, 
Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). Claims of innocent mis-
representation are resolved under section 402B of the Restatement (Second), 
which states: 
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, 
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a 
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold 
by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the 
chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, 
even though: a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and b) 
the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any 
contractual relations with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402B. 
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 10. 
211. DeSantis v. Frick Co., 745 A.2d 624, 626 n.2 (Pa. 1999) (quoting section 10 
of the Restatement (Third). 
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in the seller's liability if a reasonable person in the same situation 
would have provided such a warning.212 
Cognizant of the onerous burden of post-sale warnings on com-
merce, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) warn that, if unfounded, 
it would impose unacceptable burdens on manufacturers and sell-
ers.213 Liability is limited to parties with actual knowledge of the risk 
creating the post-sale duty to warn or those who reasonably should 
have known of the defect.214 Because a retailer is generally not in a 
position to know of this information, the retailer is normally not liable 
for failure to warn of a defect discovered after the sale.215 
Maryland law already embraces the continuing duty of a product 
seller to make reasonable efforts to warn of product defects of which 
the seller becomes aware after the product has left the seller's hands. 
The fact that a manufacturer or seller discontinued its product line or 
that the plaintiff no longer uses or is exposed to the product does not 
automatically relieve the manufacturer or seller of its continuing duty 
to warn. Rather, such matters are factors in determining what reason-
able efforts to discover the danger and to warn are required, consid-
ered along with the likelihood of harm without the warning, the 
economic costs and practical limitations associated with giving the 
warning, and the difficulty in contacting the parties to be warned.216 
The continuing duty to warn applies not only to harm caused to per-
212. [d. 
[d. 
A reasonable person would provide such a warning if: one, the 
seller knew or reasonably should have known there was a substan-
tial risk of harm to persons or property; two, the parties at risk of 
harm could be identified and reasonably be assumed to be una-
ware of the risk of harm; three, the warning could be communi-
cated to and acted upon by those to whom it is given; and four, the 
risk of injury is sufficiently great to justify providing the warning. 
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 10 cmt. a. 
214. [d. 
215. [d. Once a retailer is made aware of the risk, however, the retailer is also 
subject to liability for failure to warn if a reasonable person in the retailer's 
position would have made such a warning. [d. 
216. Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 448 n. 3, 601 A.2d 633, 647 n.13 
(1992). In Owens-Illinois, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
manufacturer or seller has a post-sale duty to warn consumers when it 
learns of a dangerous defect in the product, even if the production of the 
item has been discontinued. Id. at 448, 601 A.2d at 647. Once a manufac-
turer knows or should have known of defects discovered after a sale, it has a 
duty to use reasonable efforts to inform users of the hazards. See id. (citing 
Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971». 
Other Maryland cases imposing the post-sale duty to warn include Ra[5in v. 
Porter Hayden Co., 133 Md. App. 116, 754 A.2d 503 (2000) and ACandS v. 
Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998). 
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sons, but also to property.217 These factors parallel those suggested in 
section 10 of the Restatement (Third). 
3 .. Section 11: Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor 
for Harm Caused by Post-Sale Failure to Recall Product 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products is subject to liability for hann to persons or 
property caused by the seller's failure to recall a product af-
ter the time of sale or distribution if: 
(a) (I) a governmental directive issued pursuant to a stat-
ute or administrative regulation specifically re-
quires the seller or distributor to recall the 
product; or 
(2) the seller or distributor, in the absence of a recall 
requirement under Subsection (a)(I), undertakes 
to recall the product; and 
(b) the seller or distributor fails to act as a reasonable per-
son in recalling the product.218 
There are no reported Maryland decisions on this topic. Given the 
significant burdens imposed on manufacturers when recalling prod-
ucts, Maryland courts are likely to embrace section 11 's fundamental 
policy of allowing governmental regulatory agencies to evaluate the 
ramifications of product recall by gathering relevant data.219 This pol-
icy recognizes that a common-law duty to recall that would be trig-
gered every time a manufacturer made a product line improvement, 
even if to correct a product defect, would be undesirable.220 
IV. CHAPTER 3: LIABILI1Y OF SUCCESSORS AND APPARENT 
MANUFACTURERS 
A. Liability of Successors 
1. Section 12: Liability of Successor for Harm Caused by Defective 
Products Sold Commercially by Predecessors 
A successor corporation or other business entity that ac-
quires assets of a predecessor corporation or other business 
entity is subject to liability for hann to persons or property 
217. United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 165, 647 
A.2d 405, 414 (1994) (imposing strict liability for asbestos-containing sur-
face treatment materials incorporated into structures of public buildings). 
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § II. 
219. Seeid. 
220. A duty to recall should be distinguished from a post-sale duty to warn about 
product hazards, as in sections 10 and 13 of the Restatement (Third). See 
supra text accompanying note 210 for the text of Restatement (Third) section 
10; infra text accompanying note 242 for the text of Restatement (Third) sec-
tion 13. 
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caused by a defective product sold or otherwise distributed 
commercially by the predecessor if the acquisition: 
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for the successor to 
assume such liability; or 
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liabil-
ity for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor; or 
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the prede-
cessor; or 
(d) results in the successor becoming a continuation of 
the predecessor. 221 
The Restatement (Third)'s approach to the liability of successor cor-
porations for products sold by their predecessors follows the rule of 
the overwhelming majority of states, including Maryland.222 A succes-
sor corporation will not be liable for the predecessor's products ab-
sent the presence of one of the four special circumstances articulated 
in subparagraphs (a) through (d) of section 12.223 
a. Maryland's Imposition of Liability and Exceptions Thereto on Successor 
Entities For Acts of Predecessor Organization 
Maryland imposes liability and provides exceptions to liability onto 
successor entities for acts of predecessor entities both through judicial 
decisions and statutory enactments. 
(1) Judicially Imposed Liability and Exceptions in Maryland 
In Nissen Corp. v. Mille?24 a consumer was injured on a treadmill 
manufactured by a corporation sold to a successor entity.225 In that 
case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted "the general rule of 
non-liability of a successor corporation, with its four traditional excep-
tions."226 The "four traditional exceptions" that result in the succes-
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12. 
222. See infra notes 226-225 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicially 
imposed liability on successor organizations. 
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12. 
224. 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991). 
225. [d. at 615,594 A.2d at 565. Fredrick Brandt bought a treadmill from Atlan-
tic Fitness Products that was designed, manufactured, and marketed by 
American Tredex Corporation. [d. Later that year, Nissen Corporation 
purchased the trade name, patents, inventory, and other assets of American 
Tredex in an asset purchase agreement. [d. The agreement included some 
obligations and liabilities but expressly excluded assumption of liability for 
injuries resulting from any product previously sold by American Tredex. 
[d. American Tredex would continue for five years under the name AT 
Corporation. [d. Over five years after his purchase, Brandt was injured us-
ing his treadmill. [d. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565. He filed suit against Ameri-
can Tredex, AT Corporation (after it had been administratively dissolved), 
Nissen, and Atlantic. [d. 
226. 323 Md. 613, 619, 632,594 A.2d 564, 566, 573 (1991). The court declined 
to add a fifth exception to successor non-liability, "continuity of enterprise." 
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sor entity being liable occur when: "(1) there is an express or implied 
agreement to assume the liabilities; (2) the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger; (3) the successor entity is a mere continua-
tion or reincarnation of the predecessor entity; or (4) the transaction 
was fraudulent, not made in good faith, or made without sufficient 
consideration."227 Although phrased in the converse and ordered dif-
ferently, the substance of section 12 of the Restatement (Third) was 
adopted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Nissen Corp. v. 
Miller. 228 
(2) Statutorily Created Liability of Successor Entities in Maryland 
The Nissen court229 also recognized two statutorily created excep-
tions to the general rule that a successor corporation is not liable for 
acts of the predecessor entity-section 3-115 of the Corporations and 
Associations Article of the Maryland Code and the Fraudulent Convey-
ances Act, contained in the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland 
Code.230 
Section 3-115 (c) of the Corporations and Associations Article "pro-
vides that upon transfer of all or substantially all assets, [t] he successor 
is liable for all the debts and obligations of the transferor to the extent 
provided in the Articles of Transfer."231 When comparing section 12 
of the Restatement (Third) to this subsection, under this statute, Mary-
land will at least impose liability for obligations expressly agreed 
under section 12(a) as set forth in the Articles of Transfer.232 
Section 3-115(e) "provides that following a consolidation or merger 
'[ t] he successor is liable for all debts and obligations of each non-
surviving corporation."'233 Section 12(c) of the Restatement (Third) 
provides that a successor entity is liable for acts of the predecessor if 
the joining of the organizations "constitutes a consolidation or merger 
with the predecessor."234 In a consolidation, two or more entities are 
227. 
228. 
229. 
230. 
23l. 
232. 
233. 
234. 
Id. at 617, 594 A.2d at 565. See infra notes 239, 241 and accompanying text 
for an elaboration of the distinctions between continuity of enterprise and 
continuation of the predecessor. 
Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 566 (footnotes omitted in original) 
(citing 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 7:1, at 10-12 (Travers 
rev. ed. 1999); accord 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAND, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 2.06 (1989); 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRNATE CORPO-
RATIONS § 7122, at 231 (rev. perm. ed. 1990)). 
Compare supra note 226 and accompanying text with text accompanying 
supra note 22l. 
See supra notes 225-225 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nissen 
Corp. 
Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617-18,594 A.2d at 566 (discussing Smith v. Navistar 
Int'[ Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1446 (D. Md. 1988)). 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS. § 3-114(c) (2001). 
Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 566 (citing Smith, 737 F. Supp. at 
1446). 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS. § 3-114(e) (2001). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12(c). 
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joined and dissolved, resulting in a new entity, whereas, in a merger, 
two or more entities are joined and one of the original entities 
emerges as the successor entity.235 Because there is a non-surviving 
entity in both, the application of section 3-115(e) of the Maryland 
Code and section 12(c) of the Restatement (Third) is the same-liability 
is imposed on successor entities of the non-surviving predecessor of 
the acts of the predecessor that would otherwise impose liability had it 
remained in existence. 
Liability on successor entities is additionally imposed as a result of 
the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, contained in title 15 of the Commer-
cial Law Article of the Maryland Code.236 These provisions "protect[ ] 
the rights of creditors of a corporation which transfers its assets with 
an intent to defraud or without fair consideration .... "237 This is anal-
ogous to section 12(b) of the Restatement (Third), which imposes liabil-
ity on successor entities that "result[ ] from a fraudulent conveyance 
to escape liability for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor. ... "238 
b. Continuation of Predecessor Distinguished From Continuity of Enterprise 
The "continuation of the predecessor" exception recognized in sub-
paragraph (d) of section 12 should not be confused with the more 
liberal "continuity of enterprise" exception adopted by a small minor-
ity of states. Under this minority approach, liability may be imposed if 
there is a mere continuation of the predecessor's business activities 
even though there is no continuity of shareholders, officers, or direc-
tors.239 Both Maryland and the Restatement (Third) have rejected that 
minority exception.240 
In determining whether the continuation of the predecessor excep-
tion recognized in section 12(d) of the Restatement (Third) applies, the 
most important indicia of continuation, in addition to continuation of 
the predecessor's business activities, are common identities of officers, 
directors, and shareholders in the predecessor and successor 
corporations.241 
235. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 303, 1002 (7th ed. 1999). 
236. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
237. Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 617-18,594 A.2d at 566 (quoting Smith, 737 F. Supp. 
at 1446. 
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12(b). 
239. This theory is largely based on the on the need to compensate victims eligi-
ble under section 402A of the Restatement (Second). See Nissen Corp, 323 Md. 
at 619, 594 A.2d at 567 (quoting Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 892 F.2d 75, 80 
(3rd Cir. 1986». 
240. See supra note 226 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nissen Corp.; 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 cmt. b. 
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 cmt. g. 
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2. Section 13: Liability of Successor for Harm Caused by Successor's 
Own Post-Sale Failure to Warn 
(a) A successor corporation or other business entity that 
acquires assets of a predecessor corporation or other 
business entity, whether or not liable under the rule 
stated in § 12, is subject to liability for hann to per-
sons or property caused by the successor's failure to 
warn of a risk created by a product sold or distributed 
by the predecessor if: 
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide ser-
vices for maintenance or repair of the product or 
enters into a similar relationship with purchasers 
of the predecessor's products giving rise to actual 
or potential economic advantage to the successor; 
and 
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the succes-
sor would provide a warning. 
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor 
would provide a warning if: 
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know 
that the product poses a substantial risk of hann 
to persons or property; and 
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can 
be identified and can reasonably be assumed to be 
unaware of the risk of hann; and 
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and 
acted on by those to whom a warning might be 
provided; and 
(4) the risk of hann is sufficiently ~eat to justify the 
burden of providing a warning. 42 
Under section 13 of the Restatement (Third), the successor is gener-
ally considered to be a pure volunteer upon whom there is no legal 
duty to act or warn.243 Exceptions arise in two circumstances: (1) the 
successor entered into a relationship with purchasers of the predeces-
sor's products, such as a maintenance agreement, that results in actual 
or potential economic advantage; and (2) a reasonable person in the 
position of the successor would provide a warning of the defect. 244 
Section 13 imposes greater liability on successor entities that become 
involved with the predecessor product and its users, in comparison to 
section 12, where there is no similar relationship.245 
There is no reported decision that clearly articulates whether and, if 
so, under what circumstances, Maryland imposes a duty on a successor 
242. [d. § 13. 
243. See id. 
244. See id. 
245. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 with supra text accompanying note 242. 
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corporation to warn of risks created by a product sold or distributed 
by its predecessor. Dicta in two products liability cases considered by 
Maryland courts, however, is instructive.246 
In ACandS, Inc. v. Abate,247 Maryland's intermediate appellate court 
appears to have approved the liability of a successor for a failure to 
warn of the hazards of asbestos products of its predecessor.248 Succes-
sor liability was addressed within a more general discussion of alleged 
juror confusion regarding the court's charge.249 The trial judge in-
formed the jury that there was a successor liability claim against Rapid, 
one of the appellant-defendants, and that the claims against Rapid 
involved the predecessor entity.250 The trial court had previously in-
structed the jury of the continuing duty of a manufacturer to reasona-
bly warn of product defects that the manufacturer discovers after the 
time the sale, and did not modify its instruction when instructing the 
jury about the successor liability.251 Counsel for Rapid, the successor 
246. See Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 613,594 A.2d at 564; ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. 
App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998). 
247. 121 Md. App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998). 
248. Id. at 638, 710 A.2d at 968. ACandS was an appeal of the second of two 
consolidated trials in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City known as "Abate 
II," concerning litigation over asbestos-containing products. Id. at 602, 710 
A.2d at 950. See also ACandS, Inc. v. Goodwin, 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 116 
(1995). Abate II involved five trial plaintiffs and an estimated 1,300 com-
mon-issue plaintiffs. ACandS, 121 Md. App. at 602, 710 A.2d at 950. The 
plaintiffs filed claims of negligence and strict liability against eleven defend-
ants, five of who were appellants in the appeal: Rapid American Corp. 
("Rapid"), the successor in interest to Philip Carey Mfg. Co.; John Crane, 
Inc. ("Crane"); US Mineral Production Co. ("U.S. Mineral"); E.L. Stebbing 
& Co., Inc. ("Stebbing"); and Hampshire Indust., Inc. ("Hampshire"). Id. 
at 604,710 A.2d at 951. Abate II was divided into three phases. Id. at 605-
07,710 A.2d at 951-52. The parameters of the appeal were determined by a 
threejudge panel from members of the court of special appeals. Id. at 608, 
710 A.2d at 953. As a result, the appeal of any order lacking the amount of 
damages was dismissed because there was no final order from which to ap-
peal, leaving only Rapid, Crane, U.S. Mineral, Stebbing and Hampshire eli-
gible to proceed with the appeal. Id. 
249. Id. at 636-37, 710 A.2d at 967-68. 
250. Id. The appellate court recounted the trial judge's finding: 
[T]here were successor liability claims against Rapid [and another 
successor not included in this appeal]. [The trial judge] later in-
structed the jury that the claims against Rapid involved the Philip 
Carey Manufacturing Company, which because Philip Carey Cor-
poration in 1967. The judge explained: "1 have made a legal deci-
sion that you need not consider [Rapid's] liability for the Philip 
Carey Manufacturing Company ['old Carey, '] or the Philip Carey 
Corporation, new Carey, for any actions after June 1, 1967 .... Now 
I have also ruled, as a matter of law, that [Rapid] is liable as a suc-
cessor to Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, which is old Carey, 
for its products and actions up through June 1, [19]67. " 
Id. at 637, 710 A.2d at 967 (alteration in original). See also supra note 248 
for a list of the appellant-defendants in ACandS. 
251. ACandS, 121 Md. App. at 637, 710 A.2d at 967-68. The appellate court dis-
cussed the trial court's instruction: 
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entity, argued that the judge's instruction prohibited the jury from 
finding Rapid had successor liability for its predecessor beyond June 
1, 1967, the date that the predecessor organized as another business 
entity.252 In resolving the issue, the appellate court stated: 
As its verdict makes clear, the jury disagreed. In light of [the 
trial judge's] instruction as to the continuing duty to warn, 
that disagreement was quite logical. It is apparent that the 
judge meant merely to inform the jury that it could not hold 
Rapid liable for the actions of new Carey. We acknowledge 
that the instruction could have been more carefully worded. 
We do not agree, however, that it can be read to foreclose a 
finding that old Carey or its successor, Rapid, had a continu-
ing duty to warn after 1967.253 
In essence, the court ruled that a successor may not be liable for fail-
ing to warn after becoming a successor entity. To simplify, an infer-
ence can be drawn from the last-quoted sentence that a successor 
entity may have a continuing duty to warn of products of its 
predecessor. 
It is important to note the limitations of this case in relation to Ma-
ryland's adoption of the Restatement (Third). The court did not discuss 
whether the criteria necessary for liability under section 13 were pre-
sent, specifically whether the successor continued some sort of for-
profit relationship with the predecessor's clients or whether a reasona-
ble person would have made the warning.254 Also, there is no deter-
mination by the court that there is a duty to warn, merely a holding 
that the instruction given to the jury is not limited to a finding that 
Previously, in the context of explaining the duty to warn of product 
defects, [the trial judge] had instructed the jury as follows: 
"Now, there is also what is called a continuing duty to warn. A 
manufacturer of the defective product generally has the duty to 
warn of product defects which the manufacturer discovers at the 
time of the sale. A manufacturer is obligated to reasonably com-
municate an effective warning even after a sale of a product based 
on later acquired knowledge of the danger as soon as it is reasona-
bly foreseeable. 
This post-sale duty to warn requires reasonable efforts to inform 
users of the danger once the manufacturer is or should be aware of 
the need for a warning. The warning is required to the extent 
practicable under the circumstances." 
The judge did not modify his instruction on duty to warn when he 
instructed the jury about old and new Carey. 
Id. at 637-38, 710 A.2d at 967-68. 
252. Id. See also supra note 250 for an excerpt of the trial court's instruction to 
the jury regarding Rapid and old and new Carey and supra note 251 for an 
excerpt of the trial court's instruction to the jury. 
253. ACandS, 121 Md. App. at 638, 710 A.2d at 968 (emphasis added). 
254. See supra text accompanying note 242 for the text of section 13 of the Re-
statement (Third). 
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the successor had a continuing duty to warn.255 The court of special 
appeals did not disclose the circumstances under which the trial court 
had imposed successor liability nor its basis for charging the jury re-
garding a continuing duty to warn. Thus, it cannot be determined 
from the facts disclosed in the opinion whether Maryland law follows 
the rule enunciated in section 13 of the Restatement (Third).256 
3. Section 14: Selling or Distributing as One's Own a Product Manu-
factured by Another 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distribut-
ing products who sells or distributes as its own a product 
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as 
though the seller or distributor were the product's 
manufacturer.257 
Section 14 of the Restatement (Third) embodies the "apparent manu-
facturer" doctrine whereby a business distributing products manufac-
tured by another is subject to the same liability as if the distributor 
had actually manufactured the product.258 This section is derived 
from section 400 of the Restatement (Second),259 which establishes fault-
based liability on manufacturers and distinguishes manufacturers 
from non-manufacturer product sellers.26o Because section 402A of 
255. 
256. 
257. 
258. 
259. 
260. 
See supra text accompanying note 253 for the holding of the court in 
ACandS regarding this issue. 
As discussed under section 12, in Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland reviewed its rationale for adopting strict products liability, stat-
ing "We adopted the theory of strict liability in tort to foreclose the unfair 
result 'where injured parties are forced to comply with the proof require-
ments of negligence actions or are confronted with the procedural require-
ments and limitations of warranty actions." Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 
613,623,594 A.2d 564, 569 (quoting Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 
377,353,363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976)). The court explained that, while the 
"equity" of shifting the risk of loss to those better able to bear it was a policy 
consideration, it was not the only consideration, and that the idea that sell-
ers who place defective and unreasonably dangerous products on the mar-
ket are at fault when someone is injured and should be held responsible is 
inherent in recognizing strict products liability. Id. at 624,594 A.2d at 569. 
"A corporate successor is not a seller and bears no blame in bringing the 
product and the user together." Id. The court believed that it was unfair to 
require such a party to bear the liability because it is perceived as a "deep 
pocket." Id. See also supra section 12 beginning at note 221 for a discus-
sion of Maryland's general rule for adoption of successor liability. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 14. 
See id.; see also id. § 14 cmt. c. This doctrine does not apply to impose liabil-
ity on a trademark owner who grants a manufacturer a license to use the 
trademark or logo on the product, so long as the trademark owner does 
not substantially participate in the product's design, manufacture, or distri-
bution. Id. § 14 cmt. d. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 400. Section 400 states: "One who puts out as his 
own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same lia-
bility as through he were its manufacturer." Id. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 14 cmt. a. 
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the Restatement (Second) imposed strict liability on all commercial sell-
ers of defective products for injuries that resulted from the defect,261 
this section is only relevant in jurisdictions that treat the liability of 
non-manufacturers differently than manufacturers.262 Although Ma-
ryland courts initially did not differentiate between sellers and manu-
facturers when imposing strict liability for defective products,263 for 
sellers of defective products who, generally, did not manufacture, al-
ter, or mishandle the product, did not know of the defect, and could 
not have discovered the defect while exercising reasonable care,264 
the Maryland legislature created an exception in the form of a sealed-
container defense.265 The sealed-container defense does not apply to 
sellers who "manufacture, produce, design, or designate the specifica-
tions for the product"266 or who "alter, modify, assemble, or mishan-
dle the product."267 It is not clear whether this defense is applicable 
to sellers "who sell [ ] or distribute [ ] as [their] own a product manu-
factured by another,"268 as is set forth in section 14 of the Restatement 
(Third). 
V. CHAPTER 4: PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILI1Y 
A. Causation 
1. Section 15: General Rule Governing Causal Connection Between 
Product Defect and Harm 
Whether a product defect caused hann to persons or prop-
erty is detennined by the Erevailing rules and principles gov-
erning causation in tort.2 9 
Maryland law requires that, under strict liability principles, a prod-
uct defect must be the proximate cause-in-fact of the harm for which 
261. [d. 
262. See id. § 14 cmt. b; see also William A. Dreier, The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability and New Jersey Law-Not Quite Perfect Together, 50 
RUTGERS L. REv. 2059, 2131 (1998) (noting that "[w]hether section 400 
had been superceded by section 402A, which imposed strict liability on all 
product sellers, is of little moment because the outcome remains the 
same"). 
263. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 
963 (1976). 
264. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (2000); Reed v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 934 F. Supp. 713,713 (D. Md. 1996) (discussing Maryland's "sealed 
container defense" when manufacturing defect in a new product alleged). 
265. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mary-
land's sealed container statute, contained in section 5-405(b) of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code. 
266. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-405(4) (2000). 
267. [d. § 5-405(5). 
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 14. 
269. [d. § 15. 
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recovery is sought.270 Maryland courts have not adopted alternative 
theories of liability that would relieve a plaintiff of proving this bur-
den, such as market share liability.271 
The concepts of product misuse, modification, and alteration are 
forms of post-sale conduct by product-users or others that can be rele-
vant to the determination of issues of defect,272 causation,273 and ap-
portionment of liability.274 As such, they are not discrete legal 
issues275 but rather are largely intertwined with the concept of foresee-
ability, fairness in allocating the burdens of proof, and responsibility 
among the parties. The Restatement (Third) does not address the allo-
cation of these burdens, which may differ widely from one jurisdiction 
to the next.276 
270. 
271. 
272. 
273. 
274. 
275. 
276. 
See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); see also 
generally TidIer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (deny-
ing plaintiffs' recovery because, as they were unable to identify the defend-
ants as the manufacturer of the drug they had ingested, they lacked the 
"essential element of a traditional products liability claim"-causation) (ap-
plying Maryland and District of Columbia laws); Foster v. American Home 
Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 167-68 ( D. Md. 1994) (denying plaintiffs' claim 
for negligent misrepresentation against a drug manufacturer initiated after 
their daughter's death by ingesting a generic equivalent of the defendant's 
drug because Maryland courts require showing that the defendant manu-
factured the injury-causing product); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 
F. Supp. 89, 93 (D. Md. 1989) (denying recovery to a plaintiff unable to 
prove that defendant had manufactured the breast implant causing her in-
jury and refusing to adopt a market-share approach, stating Maryland law 
"requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant manufactured the prod-
uct which allegedly caused the injury."). 
Using a market-share theory of liability, plaintiffs may recover against each 
manufacturer proportionally according to each manufacturer's share of the 
market, without having to prove causation for each defendant. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) § 15 cmt. c. Some courts have rejected this market share 
approach because it is inconsistent with the concept of joint and several 
liability, the general rule of causation in tort law. [d. In Tidier, the court 
stated that the market-share approach is often rejected because approach 
because of the difficulty in apportioning the damages. Tidier, 851 F.2d at 
422 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), which 
applied the market-share approach in determining defendants' liability). 
Although the Restatement (Third) takes no position on whether the market-
share theory of proportional liability should be adopted, a substantial num-
ber of courts addressing the issue have refused to adopt such a rule. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) § 15 cmt. c. 
[d. § 2. See supra text accompanying note 11 for the text of section 2 of the 
Restatement (Third). 
Causation is discussed in this section. 
RESTATEMENT § 17. See infra text accompanying note 295 for the text of 
section 17 of the Restatement (Third). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. p. 
See id. §§ 2 cmt. p, 15 cmt. b, 17 cmts. c, d. For a discussion of the current 
Maryland law on these issues, see infra text accompanying notes 295-322. 
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2. Section 16: Increased Harm Due to Product Defect 
(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial 
sale or other distribution and the defect is a substan-
tial factor in increasing the plaintiff's hann suffered 
beyond that which would have resulted from other 
causes, the product seller is subject to liability for the 
increased hann. 
(b) If proof supports a determination of the hann that 
would have resulted from other causes in the absence 
of the product defect, the product seller's liability is 
limited to the increased hann attributable solely to 
product defect. 
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Sub-
section (b) of the hann that would have resulted in the 
absence of the product defect, the product seller is lia-
ble for all of the plaintiff's hann attributable to the 
defect and other causes. 
(d) A seller of a defective product that is held liable for 
part of the hann suffered by the plaintiff under Sub-
section (b), or all the hann suffered by the plaintiff 
under Subsection (c), is jointly and severally liable or 
severally liable with other parties who bear legal re-
sponsibility for causing the hann, determined by ap-
plicable rules of joint and several liability.277 
323 
Section 16 of the Restatement (Third) addresses "enhanced injury" 
claims, also referred to as "crashworthiness" or "second-collision" 
cases.278 In order to recover for enhanced injuries in a product-defect 
case under this section, a plaintiff must establish that the defect was a 
substantial factor in producing harm to the plaintiff, beyond the harm 
that would have resulted from causes not related to the defect.279 For 
example, in a design-defect claim, the plaintiff must show that a rea-
sonable, alternative design would have reduced the plaintiff's injuries 
in the accident as well as not create other, different injuries.28o 
277. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 16. 
278. [d. § 16 cmt. a (explaining that section 16 addresses "crashworthiness" 
cases). These cases may be referred to as enhanced injury cases because 
the plaintiff's claim is not that the defect in the product caused the acci-
dent, rather, that the injury resulting from the accident was either the 
cause of or exacerbated by, the defect. [d. These cases are typically 
brought against car manufacturers, whose design of a vehicle caused en-
hanced injuries during an accident that was otherwise unrelated to the de-
fect. [d. 
279. See id. § 16 cmt. a. 
280. [d. § 16 cmt. b. Comment b states: 
[I] n connection with a design defect claim in the context of in-
creased harm, the plaintiff must establish that a reasonable alterna-
tive design would have reduced plaintiff's harm .... It is not 
sufficient that the alternative design would have reduced or pre-
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Maryland law is consistent with the rules established in section 
16.281 The "crashworthiness" doctrine was recognized in 1974 in Volk-
swagen of America, Inc. v. Young. 282 In Volkswagen, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that actions based on crashworthiness claims are es-
sentially negligence claims and, therefore, liability should be imposed 
on a manufacturer based on "traditional principles of negligence."283 
Although jurisdictions differed regarding the level of accident foresee-
ability and the extent to which a manufacturer should prevent injury, 
the Volkswagen court held that a manufacturer had a duty to reduce 
injuries in accidents when possible.284 
The burden on the Maryland plaintiff establishing a prima facie en-
hanced injury cause of action is appropriately high. Six elements 
must be shown: (1) that a safer alternative design existed; (2) that it 
281. 
282. 
283. 
284. 
vented the harm the plaintiff suffered if the alternative would intro-
duce into the product other dangers of equal or greater 
magnitude. 
Id.; accord Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 74 Md. App. 613, 625-28, 
539 A.2d 701, 707-08 (1998) (denying recovery for plaintifPs enhanced in-
juries because of failure to prove that the proposed design alternative, mo-
torcycle crash bars, would have protected lower extremities without 
significantly increasing the risk of injury to other parts of the body). 
See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 120,740 A.2d 102, 118 
(1999) (involving death from vehicle accident, "the plaintiff must produce 
sufficient evidence to establish that the design of the vehicle in question 
caused an otherwise survivable accident to be fatal"); Ziegler, 74 Md. App. at 
627, 539 A.2d at 708 (design-defect claim-motorcycle crash bars) (finding 
plaintiff produced insufficient evidence "that the injuries sustained would 
have been lessened because of the presence of a protective device"); Valk 
Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 327, 537 A.2d 622, 633 (1988) 
(design- defect claim-protruding snow plow hitch) ("[AJ plaintiff need 
show only some evidence of enhanced injuries [caused by a product de-
fect]."); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 41 Md. App. 579, 589, 
398 A.2d. 490, 498 (1979) (manufacturing defect claim-van roof welds); 
see also Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975) 
(design defect claim-automobile roof and seat assembly); Volkswagen of 
Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974) (design defect 
claim-automobile seat assembly); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. 
App. 695, 566 A.2d 135 (1989) (design defect claim-motorcycle crash 
bars). 
272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). In trying this wrongful death action, the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified a ques-
tion to the Court of Appeals of Maryland regarding the liability of manufac-
turers in enhanced injury cases under Maryland law. Id. at 203, 321 A.2d at 
738. The plaintiffs alleged that the death of the driver of the 1968 Volk-
swagen Beetle resulted from the defective design of the passenger compart-
ment. Id. at 203-05, 321 A.2d at 738-39. The driver, stopped at a traffic 
light, was rear-ended by another car. Id. at 204, 321 A.2d at 739. Relying 
on the crashworthiness doctrine, the plaintiffs claimed that the seat assem-
bly failed during the collision, propelling the driver into the rear of the car 
where he sustained the fatal injuries. Id. at 204-06, 321 A.2d at 739-40. This 
defect, not the accident, caused or enhanced the driver's injuries after the 
initial accident. Id. 
Id. at 221, 321 A.2d at 747. 
Id. at 214-215, 321 A.2d at 744. 
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was technologically feasible to incorporate the alternative design at 
the time the product was manufactured; (3) that the materials re-
quired for the alternative design were available; (4) the anticipated 
cost of production with the alternative design; (5) the anticipated 
price to consumer with the alternative design; and (6) the likelihood 
of consumer acceptance of the alternative design.285 Further, the 
plaintiff must also demonstrate that the design utilized caused more 
injuries than an alternative design would.286 In cases where the injury 
resulted in death, the plaintiff must prove that the defective design 
"caused an otherwise survivable accident to be fatal."287 
The manufacturer of a product, such as a car, is not required to 
design a perfectly safe product under the crashworthiness doctrine; it 
is only required to use reasonable care in the product's design while 
also incorporating safer designs when possible to prevent enhanced 
injuries in foreseeable accidents.288 Further, if the enhanced injury is 
the result of a less safe design that would be obvious to the user, such 
as a convertible roof-top versus a hard roof-top on an automobile, 
then the plaintiff's recovery is precluded.289 
Consistent with section 16 (c), Maryland law provides that if a plain-
tiff establishes that a product defect was a substantial factor in increas-
ing the harm suffered by the plaintiff beyond that which would have 
resulted from other causes, and if the proof adduced at trial does not 
support apportionment of liability, then the product seller is liable for 
all the harm suffered by the plaintiff from both the defect and the 
other causes.290 Stated conversely, once the plaintiff establishes that 
at least some injuries were enhanced due to a defect, the burden shifts 
285. Nissan Motor Co., 129 Md. App. at 120, 740 A.2d at 118. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. See Volkswagen, 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745-46. 
289. [d. at 219, 321 A.2d at 746-47. For example, in Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor 
Co. Ltd., 80 Md. App. 695, 566 A.2d 135 (1989), the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland affirmed the lower court's holding granting summary 
judgment to the defendants, Yamaha Motor Company. [d. at 721,566 A.2d 
at 148. In Nicolson, the plaintiff sustained injury to his legs as a result of an 
accident between his motorcycle and an automobile that had turned into 
the plaintiff's path. [d. at 697, 566 A.2d at 136. The plaintiff claimed that 
his injuries were caused, or enhanced, by the failure of the defendant to 
incorporate protective devices on the motorcycle. [d. The appellate court 
upheld the lower courts ruling on summary judgment because of the "la-
tent/patent rule," limiting the manufacturer's liability when the defect was 
"open and obvious to the consumer." [d. at 715, 566 A.2d at 145. The 
court explained that this is an objective, rather than subjective rule, and the 
test is whether a reasonable consumer in the plaintiff's position would have 
noticed the danger in the particular design. [d. 
290. See Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App 579, 590, 398 A.2d 
490,501 (1979) ("indivisible injury"); see also Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 
74 Md. App. 304, 326-27, 537 A.2d 622,633 (1988) ("[O]nce a plaintiff has 
shown a modicum of enhanced injuries by testimony that the defect caused 
an otherwise survivable accident to be fatal, the burden should shift to the 
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to the defendant to limit liability.291 The defendant may do so by 
showing which injuries would have occurred had there been no de-
fect. 292 This shift of the burden onto the defendant is consistent with 
traditional tort law. 293 The manufacturer of a defective product is 
jointly and severally liable for harm enhanced as a result of a defective 
product.294 
B. Affirmative Defenses 
1. Section 17: Apportionment of Responsibility Between or Among 
Plaintiff, Sellers and Distributors of Defective Products, and 
Others 
(a) A plaintiff's recovery of damages for hann caused by a 
product defect may be reduced if the conduct of the 
plaintiff combines with the product defect to cause 
the hann and the plaintiff's conduct fails to conform 
to generally applicable rules establishing appropriate 
standards of care. 
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Sub-
section (a) and the apportionment of plaintiff's recov-
ery among multiple defendants are governed by 
generally applicable rules apportioning responsibil-
ity.295 
Section 17 defers to local law for the applicable rules of apportion~ 
ment of liability, if any, among the various actors whose conduct or 
products contribute to the plaintiff's harm. Unlike the overwhelming 
majority of other states, Maryland has not adopted any principles of 
defendants to apportion damages inter se and limit their liability, if they 
can.") (emphasis added). 
291. Lahocki, 41 Md. App. at 595-96, 398 A.2d at 501. 
292. [d. 
293. [d. at 596, 398 A.2d at 501. In Lahocki, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland held that once the plaintiff established injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident were at least enhanced by a defect in the defendant's 
product, it was the defendant's responsibility to limit it's liability. [d. 
294. See generally Sinelli v. Ford Motor Co., 810 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D. Md. 1993) 
(holding the manufacturer of a defective seat belt jointly and severally lia-
ble with negligent driver liability for injuries); Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 
304, 316, 523 A.2d 1003, 1008 (1987) (finding a physician who negligently 
treated an automobile accident victim jointly and severally liable with the 
original tortfeasor); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Springmann, 
266 Md. 200, 204-05, 292 A.2d 96, 99 (1972) (concluding that anyone sign-
ing a minor's driver's license application jointly and severally liable for the 
minor's negligent actions); Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, 
Inc., 33 Md. App. 372, 374, 365 A.2d 325, 330 (1976) (finding all negligent 
defendants jointly and severally liable in mishandling cargo); Myers v. 
Aragona, 21 Md. App. 45, 54, 318 A.2d 263, 268 (1974) (determining all 
partners jointly and severally liable for the negligent actions of one 
partner). 
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17. 
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"comparative fault" or "comparative responsibility."296 Section 17 
does not alter current Maryland law in this regard, nor would it bar 
Maryland from adopting comparative fault principles. Indeed, a 
strong m.yority of jurisdictions apply the comparative responsibility 
doctrine to products liability actions.297 In the meantime, however, 
current Maryland products liability law regarding contributory negli-
gence, assumption of the risk, misuse and product alteration remains 
unaffected by the Restatement (Third). 
a. Contributory Negligence in Maryland Tort Claims 
Contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim in 
Maryland,298 although it is a defense to a claim for breach of an im-
plied warranty of merchantability.299 Obviously, it also is a defense to a 
negligence claim.30o 
(1) Contributory Negligence by User as a Defense in Maryland Neg-
ligence Claims 
In 1983, the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to adopt com-
parative negligence principles.30l Because contributory negligence 
was adopted in Maryland in 1847,302 it was well-settled "that a plaintiff 
who fails to observe ordinary care for his own safety is contributorily 
negligent and is barred from all recovery, regardless of the quantum 
of a defendant's primary negligence."303 
Although contributory negligence has not enjoyed exclusive do-
main in Maryland, the court of appeals, however, was not persuaded 
296. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460-63, 456 
A.2d 894, 904-05 (1983); see Edward S. Digges, Jr. & Robert Dale Klein, 
Comparative Fault in Maryland-The Time Has Come, 41 MD. L. REv. 276 
(1982) . 
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 cmt. a. 
298. See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985); 
Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 537 A.2d 622 (1988); 
Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982). 
299. Yong Cha Hong v. Marriott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448 n.7 (D. Md. 1987); 
see also Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 
A.2d 744 (1970). 
300. Yong Cha Hong, 656 F. Supp. at 448 n.7. 
301. Harrison, 295 Md. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905. A mother, on behalf of herself 
and her son, brought suit against the local school board and three gym 
teachers for damages sustained by her son when he was severely and perma-
nently injured during a gymnastic exercise in physical education class. Id. 
at 444,456 A.2d at 895. At trial, plaintiffs sought jury instructions amount-
ing to pure or modified comparative negligence, i.e. that damages should 
be diminished in proportion to the child's fault. Id. at 445,456 A.2d at 895. 
The trial judge rejected the proposed instructions, implementing those 
that would completely bar recovery of damages if the child were found con-
tributorily negligent, which he was. Id. at 445-46, 456 A.2d at 895. 
302. Id. at 448,456 A.2d at 897 (citing Irwin v. Spriggs, 6 Gill 200 (1847». 
303. Id. at 451, 456 A.2d at 898 (citations omitted). 
328 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 30 
by movements toward comparative negligence. Early in the twentieth 
century, the General Assembly enacted two statutes-both of which 
have been repealed-akin to comparative negligence.304 In addition, 
although none passed, from 1966 to 1982, twenty-one bills were of-
fered to the Maryland legislature seeking to replace contributory neg-
ligence with comparative negligence.305 Of the thirty-nine states 
subscribing to comparative fault, thirty-one had done so through stat-
utory enactments.306 Therefore, in the absence of "a pressing societal 
need" to replace contributory negligence with comparative negli-
gence, the court of appeals declined to disturb 135 years of stare 
decisis. 307 
All things considered, we are unable to say that the circum-
stances of modem life have so changed as to render contrib-
utory negligence a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to 
the needs of the people of Maryland. In the final analysis, 
whether to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence 
in favor of comparative negligence involves fundamental and 
basic public policy considerations properly to be addressed 
by the legislature.308 
(2) Contributory Negligence by User in Breach of an Implied War-
ranty of Merchantability Claim 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held contributory negligence was 
an appropriate defense to breach of an implied warranty of 
merchantability claim founded in tort, contract, or both.309 This de-
fense may act as a total bar to a plaintiff's recovery.310 
It would appear that an individual using a product when he 
had actual knowledge of a defect or knowledge of facts 
which were so obvious that he must have known of a defect, 
is either no longer relying on the seller's express or implied 
304. Id. at 452-53, 456 A.2d at 899. 
305. Id. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904. 
306. Id. at 453,456 A.2d at 899. 
307. Id. at 458, 456 A.2d at 902. 
308. Id. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905. 
309. Erdman v.Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 196-97, 271 
A.2d 744, 747 (1970). The plaintiffs in Erdman observed sparks and smoke 
emanating from their television set for the third time. Id. at 193, 271 A.2d 
at 745-46. Shortly after they turned off the set to go to bed, a fire began in 
the area of the television. Id. at 196-97, 271 A.2d at 747. The court deter-
mined that the defect in the set, of which the plaintiffs were well aware, 
could no longer be used as a basis for an action of breach of warranty. Id. 
at 200, 271 A.2d at 749. Any breach of the warranty was not the proximate 
cause of the fire due to the plaintiffs' continued use of an obviously defec-
tive product. Id. at 203, 271 A.2d at 750. See also Yong Cha Hong v. Marri-
ott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448 n.7 (D. Md. 1987). 
310. Erdman, 260 Md. at 197, 271 A.2d at 748 (citing Levin v. Walter Kidde & 
Co., 251 Md. 560, 561, 248 A.2d 151, 152 (1968». 
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warranty or had interjected an intervening cause of his own, 
and therefore a breach of such warranty cannot be regarded 
as the proximate cause of the ensuing injury.311 
b. Assumption of Risk by User as a Defense in Maryland Tort Claims 
329 
Maryland recognizes assumption of therisk312 as an affirmative de-
fense to a strict liability claim, as well as to claims for negligence and 
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.3i3 To successfully 
assert assumption of the risk, a defendant must show three elements: 
(1) that the plaintiff was aware of and appreciated the specific risk or 
danger that the defect created; (2) that the plaintiff was aware of the 
risk and voluntarily encountered it; and (3) that the plaintiff's choice 
to encounter the risk was unreasonable.314 
c. Misuse by User as a Defense in Maryland Tort Claims 
Like assumption of the risk, misuse of a product is also a defense315 
to strict liability action.316 Where misuse is the sole, intervening, or 
superceding proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, a plaintiff may be 
barred from recovering in a strict liability action.317 
Once a plaintiff meets the burden of going forward with a strict 
liability claim by demonstrating that the defendant manufactured an 
unreasonably dangerous, defective product that proximately caused 
the plaintiff's injuries, the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove 
311. [d. at 196-97, 271 A.2d at 747. 
312. Assumption of the risk is enumerated in section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) and a judicially recognized defense in actions based on strict liabil-
ity in tort. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 346, 363 
A.2d 955, 959-60 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. 
313. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 597-98, 495 A.2d 348, 356 
(1985); Phipps, 278 Md. at 346,363 A.2d at 959; Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 
50 Md. App. 614, 626 n.ll, 440 A.2d 1085, 1092 n.ll (1982). 
314. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 598, 495 A.2d at 356 (citing Sheehan, 50 Md. App. at 
626 n.ll, 440 A.2d at 1092 n.ll). In Ellsworth, the plaintiff sued the fabric 
manufacturer and seller of her nightgown after it caught fire while she was 
wearing it inside-out, severely and permanently i~uring her. [d. at 586, 495 
A.2d at 351. See supra text accompanying notes 117-122 for the facts of 
Ellsworth. 
315. Maryland decisions recognize that evidence of misuse, although not techni-
cally an affirmative defense to be proved by a defendant, will defeat a strict 
liability claim where the misuse is not reasonably foreseeable. Ellsworth, 303 
Md. 581,495 A.2d 348; Phipps, 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955; Klein v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 608 A.2d 1276 (1992); Simpson v. Stan-
dard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199,527 A.2d 1337 (1987). 
316. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355. See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 117-122, note 314 for the facts of Ellsworth. 
317. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355. 
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the plaintiff misused the defective product.318 Misuse typically is a 
jury issue.3Ig 
The defense of mishandling is included under the umbrella of mis-
use.320 Mishandling occurs when an otherwise safe product becomes 
harmful after being mishandled by its user.321 
d. User's Alteration oj Product as a Defense in Maryland Tori Claims-
Evidence of substantial modification or alteration of a product after 
it has left the seller's control also may defeat a claim for strict liability 
in tort in Maryland.322 
2. Section 18: Disclaimers, Limitations, Waivers and Other Contrac-
tual Exculpations as Defenses to Products Liability Claims for 
Harm to Persons 
Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or 
other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other 
similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar 
or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against 
sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to 
persons.323 
Section 18 provides that disclaimers by product distributors and 
waivers by buyers do not bar or limit otherwise valid products liability 
claims against sellers for harm to persons from new products that are 
defective.324 This section of the Restatement (Third) is entirely consis-
tent with current Maryland law.325 
The General Assembly of Maryland afforded the same protection to 
consumers, despite products liability waivers, found in section 18 of 
the Restatement (Third).326 Similarly, in 1976, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held sellers unable to disclaim or limit warranties arising 
318. [d. at 596, 495 A.2d at 355. 
319. See, e.g., Klein, 92 Md. App. at 477,608 A.2d at 1276. 
320. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 587, 495 A.2d at 356. 
321. [d. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356. 
322. See generally Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344-45, 363 A.2d 
955, 959 (1976); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 424, 475 
A.2d 1243, 1251 (1984) (determining whether post-sale product modifica-
tions by owner constituted a substantial change or alteration in the condi-
tion under section 402A usually is a question of fact for jury). But see Hood 
v. Ryobi Am. Corp. 181 F.3d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding post-sale 
alteration of product defeated plaintiffs' claims of negligence and strict lia-
bility as a matter of law). 
323. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 18. 
324. [d. 
325. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 349, 363 A.2d at 962 ("Under § 402A of the Restate-
ment, a limitation or exclusion of warranties is irrelevant to the question of 
the seller's liability for injury caused by defective goods regardless of the 
classification of the goods [as consumer goods or otherwise]."). 
326. [d. 
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from sales of consumer goods under sections 2_316.1327 and 2A-503 of 
the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code in Phipps v. General 
Motors Corp.328 The Phipps court, adopting section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second), stated: "Under [section] 402A of the Restatement, a lim-
itation or exclusion of warranties is irrelevant to the question of a 
seller's liability for injury caused by defective goods regardless of the 
classification of goods."329 
The court expanded this holding in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,330 
by adopting comment j to section 402A, which requires sellers to warn 
buyers of a known dangerous product.331 Absent "knowledge, or by 
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight 
should have knowledge, of the presence of the ... danger," the seller 
is not strictly liable for failure to warn.332 The court stated that "[iJn a 
strict liability failure to warn case ... where a product lacks a warning 
because of insufficient knowledge on the part of the manufacturer or 
in the scientific field, the product is not defective. "333 
C. Definitions 
1. Section 19: Definition of "Product" 
For purposes of this Restatement: 
(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed 
commercially for use or consumption. Other items, 
such as real property and electricity, are products 
when the context of their distribution and use is suffi-
ciently analogous to the distribution and use of tangi-
ble personal property that it is appropriate to apply 
the rules stated in this Restatement. 
(b) Services, even when provided commercially, are not 
products. 
327. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 2-316.1 (2000). Section 2-316.1 of the Com-
mercial Law Article of the Maryland Code states in relevant part that "(2) 
[a]ny oral or written language used by a seller of consumer goods and ser-
vices, which attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify 
the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties, is unenforceable." 
Id. 
328. 278 Md. 337,349, 363 A.2d 955, 961 (1976). Section 2A-503 of the Com-
mercial Law Article of the Maryland Code states in relevant part that 
"[I] imitation, alteration or exclusion of consequential damages for injury to 
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable 
but limitation, alteration or exclusion of damages where the loss is com-
mercial is not prima facie unconscionable." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw 
§ 2A-503 (2000). 
329. Phipps, 278 Md. at 349, 363 A.2d at 962. 
330. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). 
331. Id. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641. 
332. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt.j). 
333. Id. at 438, 601 A.2d at 641. 
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(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided 
commercially, are not subject to the rules of this 
Restatement. 334 
Section 19 defines "products" as items distributed commercially for 
use, particularly tangible, personal property-which most items classi-
fied as products tend to be-and certain improvements affixed to real 
property, if used in a similar manner as tangible, personal property.335 
Services and human blood are not products within the context of the 
Restatement (Third}.336 Beyond these parameters, the issue of what is a 
"product" for purposes of strict liability is an issue for the court to 
decide as a matter of law.337 
a. Categories oj Products Under Section 19 oj the Restatement (Third) 
(1) Intangible Personal Property 
As to intangible personal property, two basic types are involved. 
The first consists of information in media such as books, maps, and 
navigational charts. First Amendment concerns about impinging on 
free speech have caused most courts to refuse to apply strict liability 
for the dissemination of false and defective information.338 One ex-
ception in this area, however, appears to be false information con-
tained in maps and navigational charts.339 
The second type of intangible product involves the transmission of 
potentially harmful intangible forces, such as electricity and x-rays. Al-
though there are no Maryland cases on point, a majority of courts in 
other states have held that electricity becomes a "product" only when 
it passes through the customer's meter and enters the customer's 
premises. Prior to that point of entry electricity is considered a 
"service. "340 
334. 
335. 
336. 
337. 
338. 
339. 
340. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 19. 
Id. 
Id. Human blood and human tissue are excluded from the scope of strict 
liability for purposes of public policy. 
Id. § 19 cmt. a. 
See, e.g., Jones v. J. B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217-18 (D. Md. 
1988) (nursing student injured treating herself with constipation remedy 
listed in nursing textbook). In Jones, the court held that a publisher was not 
strictly liable for information disseminated in its books. See id. The court 
distinguished author liability from publisher liability and noted that, de-
pending on the "nature of publication, on the intended audience, on the 
causation of fact, and on the foreseeability of damage," an author mayor 
may not be liable. Id. at 1216. A publisher cannot, however, be liable for 
the contents of an idea or knowledge in books or other published material 
because to do so would violate the principles offree speech. See id. at 1217. 
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 341-42 (9th Cir. 
1981) (holding defendant's "product" is the taking of tabular-form FAA 
landing specifications and portraying it on a graphical approach chart) (ap-
plying Nevada law). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 19 cmt. d. 
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(2) Real Property 
A majority of courts hold that a defective product that is incorpo-
rated into an improvement to realty does not lose its identity as a 
product, and that the manufacturer or a contractor may be strictly 
liable for any damages proximately caused by the defect.341 
(3) Services 
Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) provides that services, even 
those provided commercially, are not products.342 Some transactions, 
however, may involve hybrid situations where it is unclear whether the 
seller is predominantly providing a service or is selling a product.343 
Depending on the facts, resolution of that issue may be one for the 
jury.344 
b. Definition of a Product Utilized by Maryland Courts 
Maryland defines a "product" as "a tangible article, including at-
tachments, accessories, and component parts, and accompanying la-
bels, warnings, instructions, and packaging."345 For purposes of 
determining products liability, this definition includes component 
parts and dust that contains asbestos.346 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland classified human blood 
obtained via a transfusion as a service rather than the sale of a product 
after the plaintiff became infected with the Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS) from receiving contaminated blood.347 The 
341. 
342. 
343. 
344. 
345. 
346. 
347. 
Id. § 19 cmt. e. Although not expressly addressed in its opinion, this princi-
ple appears to at least have been tacitly approved by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 647 
A.2d 405 (1994), which allowed strict liability in tort recovery for asbestos-
containing surface treatment materials incorporated into structures of pub-
lic buildings. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 19(c). 
See id. § 20(c). 
See, e.g., ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 638, 7lO A.2d 944, 968 (1998) 
(holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to charge 
the jury that a contractor could not be held strictly liable in tort if its pre-
dominant purpose was the provision of a service rather than a sale of a 
product). 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUO. PROC. § 5-115 (1998). 
Ford Motor Company v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 8, 703 A.2d 1315, 1318 
(1998). (implying that asbestos-containing products as products subjecting 
manufacturers to liability). In Wood, the plaintiffs, on behalf of their de-
ceased husbands, brought wrongful death claims against the manufacturers 
of asbestos-containing products. Id. 
Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 73 Md. App. 1, 15, 532 A.2d 1081, lO89 
(1987) (holding that blood from a transfusion is not a product for four 
reasons: (1) it is the majority view throughout the country; (2) a transfusion 
is not just the sale of blood; rather the patient is paying for the actual injec-
tion and application of medical skill; (3) a court must apply the theory to 
all diseases contractible from transfusions; and (4) there is no distinction 
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court reached this conclusion after reviewing a similar case in which 
the New York Court of Appeals held that, although a hospital supplies 
blood, its predominant function is to deliver the blood through 
trained professionals-such as the hospital staff-and to provide 
whatever medical treatment considered advisable.348 
Currently, those legally authorized to "obtain[], process[], 
store[ ], distribute[ ], or use[ ] whole blood tissue, organs, or bones 
or any substance derived from human blood, tissue, organs, or 
bones"349 are granted statutory immunity from strict liability.350 Prior 
to this statute, there was no indication that commercial preparers and 
suppliers were excused from strict liability for infecting the recipient 
of a blood transfusion.351 
2. Section 20: Definition of "One Who Sells or Otherwise 
Distributes" 
348. 
349. 
350. 
351. 
For purposes of this Restatement: 
(a) One sells a product when, in a commercial context, 
one transfers ownership thereto either for use or con-
sumption or for resale leading to ultimate use or con-
sumption. Commercial product sellers include, but 
are not limited to, manufacturers, wholesalers, and 
retailers. 
(b) One otherwise distributes a product when, in a com-
mercial transaction other than a sale, one provides the 
product to another either for use or consumption or 
as a preliminary step leading to ultimate use or con-
sumption. Commercial nonsale product distributors 
include, but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, and 
those who provide products to others as a means of 
promoting either the use or consumption of such 
products or some other commercial activity. 
(c) One also sells or otherwise distributes a product when, 
in a commercial transaction, one provides a combina-
tion of products and services and either the transac-
tion taken as a whole, or the product component 
based on whether the patient was infected receiving some other service 
from the hospital). 
Id. Before July 1,1986, a court deciding whether a blood transfusion with 
contaminated blood a product looked to Maryland common law. Id. at 10, 
532 A.2d at 1086. 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-402 (2000). The law provides, "[a] le-
gally authorized person who obtains, processes, stores, distributes, or uses 
whole blood tissue, organs, or bones or any substance derived from human 
blood, tissue, organs, or bones shall have immunity from liability described 
under § 5-630 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article." Id. 
Id. 
Miles Labs., Inc. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 713,556 A.2d 1107, 1111 (1989). 
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thereof, satisfies the criteria in Subsection (a) or 
(b).352 
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Section 20 defines "one who sells or otherwise distributes" for pur-
poses of imposing liability for doing so with a defective product in 
order to impose strict liability within the context of the Restatement 
(Third).353 Generally, this phrase refers to a person or entity involved 
in transferring ownership to another seller, component-part manufac-
turer, distributor, or to the end-user.354 This section departs from sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) by recognizing that sales occur at 
all levels in the distributive chain including manufacturer sellers, 
wholesale sellers and retail sellers.355 Section 20 includes actual sales 
as well as promotional merchandise and free samples.356 In addition, 
commercial lessors of new and like-new products are treated alike.357 
Products in an obviously used condition, however, fall under section 8 
of the Restatement (Third).358 
Bailments also fall within the scope of section 20. "When the defen-
dant is in the business of selling the same type of product as is the 
subject of the bailment, the sellor/bailor is subject to strict liability for 
harm caused by defects."359 If a customer is merely permitted to use 
an item while on the bailor's premises, such as a bowling ball or a 
chair, however, a different rule applies.360 Thus, "when products are 
made available as a convenience to customers who are on the defen-
dant's premises primarily for different, although related purposes, 
and no separate charge is made, strict liability is not imposed."361 
Lastly, section 20 touches upon "sale-service hybrid transactions" 
and notes that courts are split on whether to treat such transactions as 
a sale (subject to strict liability) or a service.362 Regardless of which 
type of transaction has occurred, a product being developed that in-
jures a plaintiff is not considered to .be distributed into the stream of 
commerce and cannot be the basis of a product claim.363 The prod-
352. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 20. 
353. [d. 
354. See id. 
355. See id. § 20 cmt. b. 
356. [d. 
357. [d. 
358. [d. § 20 cmt. c. 
359. [d. § 20 cmt. f (stating that "an automobile dealer who allows a prospective 
customer to test-drive a demonstrator will be treated the same as a seller of 
the demonstrator car"). 
360. See id. § 20 cmt. c. 
361. [d. § 20 cmt. f (stating that "even when sale of a product is not contem-
plated, the commercial bailor is subject to strict liability if a charge is im-
posed as a condition of the bailment. Thus, a laundromat is subject to 
strict liability for a defective clothes dryer, and a roller rink that rents skates 
is treated similarly"). 
362. [d. § 20 cmt. d. 
363. See Dreier, supra note 262, at 2147. 
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uct has not been sold or distributed and, therefore, principles of neg-
ligence must govern the plaintiff's claim. 
When the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted strict liability in 
Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,364 it expressly adopted the language of 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second), which limited liability to "one 
who sells a product in a defective condition."365 Additionally, "seller" 
is defined in the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code as "a 
person who sells or contracts to sell goods."366 
Although other jurisdictions have extended strict liability under sec-
tion 402A to nonsale transactions, such as leases and bailments,367 to 
date Maryland has not expanded the reach of section 402A strict lia-
bility beyond the "sale" of a product. Lessors and bailors, however, 
continue be treated under negligence principles in Maryland.368 
Section 20 ( c) recognizes that some transactions may involve hybrid 
situations where it is unclear whether the seller is predominantly pro-
viding a service as opposed to selling a product.369 Depending on the 
facts, resolution of the issue may be one for the jury. For example, in 
ACandS v. Abate,370 Maryland's intermediate appellate court held that 
it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to charge the jury 
that a contractor could not be held strictly liable if its predominant 
purpose was the provision of a service rather than a sale of a 
product.371 
3. Section 21: Definition of "Harm to Persons or Property:" Recovery 
for Economic Loss 
364. 
365. 
366. 
367. 
368. 
369. 
370. 
371. 
For purposes of this Restatement, hann to persons or prop-
erty includes economic loss if caused by hann to: 
(a) the plaintiff's person; 
278 Md. 337,363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-103(1)(d) (2000); see also, e.g., Morris v. 
Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1994); Frericks v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288,336 A.2d 118 (1975); Sheehan v. Anthony 
Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982). 
See Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 74, 285 A.2d 607, 6lO. 
See, e.g., id. at 76, 285 A.2d at 611 (declining to impose strict liability on 
lessor of product and refusing to apply VCC implied warranty provisions to 
leases and bailments for hire because it applies to sales of goods); Pahanish 
v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 517 A.2d 1122 (1986). In Pahan-
ish, the plaintiff sued the operator of a horse riding stable, contending that 
operator was strictly liable because the horse riding tack contained a latent 
defect. [d. at 349, 517 A.2d at 1125. The plaintiff's complaint, however, 
alleged only negligence, not strict liability. [d. at 354, 517 A.2d at 1128. 
The court held that even if strict liability had been alleged in the pleadings, 
it would not apply to a stable operator, who "was neither the manufacturer 
or seller of the product." [d. at 354-55, 517 A.2d at 1128. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 20(c). 
121 Md. App. 590, 7lO A.2d 944 (1998). 
[d. at 638, 710 A.2d at 968. 
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(b) the person of another when hann to the other inter-
feres with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort 
law; or 
(c) the plaintiff's property other than the defective prod-
uct itself. 372 
337 
Section 21 of the Restatement (Third) provides that "harm to persons 
or property" as economic loss to the plaintiff, to another when it inter-
feres with a plaintiff's interest, or the plaintiff's property.373 Maryland 
law is consistent with the principles enunciated in this section374 and 
is, arguably, even more expansive.375 Maryland may be more expan-
sive than section 21 because recovery is allowed for economic loss, 
which is defined as the cost of correcting the dangerous condition 
when a product defect "creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of 
death or personal injury."376 
A manufacture must satisfY a two-part test that determines the de-
gree of risk to avoid imposition of the economic loss rule.377 Under 
the first prong, the severity component,378 the nature of the possible 
damage is considered; under the second prong, the probability com-
ponent,379 the likelihood of serious injury is analyzed.380 One factor 
may outweigh the other. For example, if the risk from the defect is 
severe, such as death or serious personal injury, then the probability 
372. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2l. 
373. Id. 
374. A. J. Decoster v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 333 Md. 245, 260, 634 A.2d 1330, 
1337 (1994) (limiting tort liability to situations where a product defect 
causes physical harm to persons or to property other than the defective 
product itself and allowing strict liability recovery under section 402A for 
both physical harm to persons and to property). 
375. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 156-57, 
647 A.2d 405, 410 (1994) (allowing strict liability recovery for costs of abat-
ing asbestos-containing building materials from structures of public build-
ings). In United States Gypsum Co., Baltimore City sought to recover 
damages resulting from the cost of discovering, managing, rectifying, and 
removing surface product~ containing asbestos in several city-owned build-
ings. Id. at 152, 647 A.2d at 408. The court provided that, although the 
damages sought were purely economic, where the defect presented a sub-
stantial risk of personal injury or death, recovery is permitted. Id. at 157, 
647 A.2d at 41l. 
376. Id. at 156-57, 647 A.2d at 410; see also Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 
340 Md. 519, 545-46, 667 A.2d 624, 637-38 (1994) (barring recovery for 
economic loss to homeowners who failed to establish that defects in ply-
wood used in roofs had created serious and 'unreasonable risk of death or 
personal injury in tort). 
377. Morris, 340 Md. at 533, 667 A.2d at 63l. 
378. This prong was developed from the holding of Council of Co-Owners Atlantis 
Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 35, 517 
A.2d 336, 345 (1986). 
379. This prong was developed from the holding of United States Gypsum Co. 
United States Gypsum Co., 336 Md. at 156-58, 647 A.2d at 410-11. 
380. Morris, 340 Md. at 533-34, 667 A.2d at 632. 
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factor maybe less determinative.381 Similarly, if the probability of in-
jury is great, the severity of the harm may be less.382 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the last forty years, thousands of judicial decisions nationwide 
have fine-tuned and expanded upon the simple but profound enunci-
ation of legal principle distilled into the ALI's Restatement (Second) for-
mulation of Section 402A strict liability for defective products. The 
evolution of products liability concepts sculpted by decades of com-
mon-law advance has necessitated the ALI's Restatement (Third). What 
once was capable of articulation in two sentences of a single section of 
ALI "black letter" now requires 21 sections and many more sentences 
to convey. 
By and large, the Maryland courts have traveled with the main-
stream of other states' courts on an issue-laden journey from one Re-
statement to the next. Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
not yet had occasion to consider formal adoption of any particular 
section of the Restatement (Third), the Maryland law of products liability 
as developed by the Maryland courts under Section 402A has, in the 
main, been very consistent with the precepts now encapsulated in the 
Restatement (Third). 
In a few areas, current Maryland law appears to diverge-sometimes 
in a more liberal direction but at other times in a more conservative 
way-from the principles of the Restatement (Third). Such areas in-
clude the circumstances under which a successor has a duty to warn of 
the hazards of the products of its predecessor;383 whether non-compli-
ance or compliance with government safety standards, respectively, 
constitute per se liability or a per se defense;384 the circumstances under 
which a seller of used products may be liable for a product defect;385 
and providing for recovery of "economic loss" in Maryland not only 
when there is actual harm to person or property, but also when there 
is "a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or serious personal 
injury. "386 
Finally, other areas covered by the Restatement (Third) remain as yet 
unexplored by Maryland judicial decisions. For example, Maryland 
appellate precedent has yet to clearly address whether strict liability 
will be extended to include bailors and lessors of products;387 the cir-
381. [d. at 533-34, 667 A.2d at 631-32. 
382. [d. In Morris, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied recovery to the 
plaintiffs, finding that the defective product did not present a substantial 
risk of death or serious personal injury. [d. at 536, 667 A.2d at 633. 
383. See supra notes 224-41 and accompanying text. 
384. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text. 
385. See supra notes 187-202 and accompanying text. 
386. See supra notes 372-82 and accompanying text. 
387. See supra notes 352-68 and accompanying text. 
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cumstances, if any, under which intangible things (for example, elec-
tricity and X-rays) or things attached to real property will be 
considered products;388 or the line of demarcation between a product 
and a service in so-called hybrid transaction circumstances.389 Mary-
land courts have not yet considered whether to embrace the "no-net-
benefit-to-any-class-of-patient" liability requirement for prescription 
drugs and medical devices of section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third);390 
the circumstances under which component-parts sellers may be liable 
for defects in the final product even though the component itself is 
not defective;391 or whether to adopt, as the Maryland federal district 
court believes they will, the "reasonable consumer-expectation" test 
for tainted food products.392 Importantly, Maryland courts also have 
yet to decide whether to follow the admonishment of section 2, com-
ment n of the Restatement (Third) that courts should not submit under 
different, confusing doctrinal labels, multiple theories of recovery in 
jury charges in cases involving two or more factually identical defec-
tive-design claims or two or more factually identical failure-to-warn 
claims.393 
In short, the Maryland judiciary is likely to have ample opportunity 
for many interesting debates about the course they wish to chart for 
Maryland products liability law for the decades yet to come-before 
the ALI steps forward to announce a "Restatement (Fourth)." 
388. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text. 
389. See supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text. 
390. See supra Part II.B.2. 
391. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. 
392. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
393. See supra Part II.A.2.h.(l). 
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VII. APPENDIX: SECTION 402A OF THE RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) 
Section 402A: Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physi-
cal Harm to User or Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to 
his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or 
to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling 
such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product 
from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. 394 
394. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A. 
